The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Expansion as a formal holding occurred in Hans v. Louisiana, 1 a suit against the state by a resident of that state brought in federal court under federal question jurisdiction, alleging a violation of the Contract Clause in the state’s repudiation of its obligation to pay interest on certain bonds. Admitting that the Amendment on its face prohibited only the entertaining of a suit against a state by citizens of another state, or citizens or subjects of a foreign state, the Court nonetheless thought the literal language was an insufficient basis for decision. Rather, wrote Justice Bradley for the Court, the Eleventh Amendment was a result of the
shock of surprise throughout the country at the Chisholm decision and reflected the determination that the decision was wrong and that federal jurisdiction did not extend to making defendants of unwilling states. 2
Under this view, the amendment reversed an erroneous decision and restored the proper interpretation of the Constitution. The views of the opponents of subjecting states to suit
were most sensible and just; and [those views] apply equally to the present case as to that then under discussion. The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of. 3
The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . . The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law. 4 Thus, although the literal terms of the Amendment did not so provide,
the manner in which [Chisholm] was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the reason of the thing, 5 led the Court unanimously to hold that states could not be sued by their own citizens on grounds arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Then, in Ex parte New York (No. 1), 6 the Court held that, absent consent to suit, a state was immune to suit in admiralty, the Eleventh Amendment’s reference to
any suit in law or equity notwithstanding.
That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence . . . of which the Amendment is but an exemplification. . . . It is true the Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity; but this is because . . . the Amendment was the outcome of a purpose to set aside the effect of the decision of this court in Chisholm v. Georgia . . . from which it naturally came to pass that the language of the Amendment was particularly phrased so as to reverse the construction adopted in that case. 7 Just as Hans v. Louisiana had demonstrated the
impropriety of construing the Amendment so as to permit federal question suits against a state, so
it seems to us equally clear that it cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its own citizens or not. 8 An in rem admiralty action may be brought, however, if the state is not in possession of the res. 9
And in extending protection against suits brought by foreign governments, the Court made clear the immunity flowed not from the Eleventh Amendment but from concepts of state sovereign immunity generally.
Manifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the . . . postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' The Federalist, No. 81. 10
In the 1980s, four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, argued that Hans was incorrectly decided, that the Amendment was intended only to deny jurisdiction against the states in diversity cases, and that Hans and its progeny should be overruled. 11 But the remaining five Justices adhered to Hans and in fact stiffened it with a rule of construction quite severe in its effect. 12 The Hans interpretation was further solidified with the Court’s ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 13 that Congress lacks the power under Article I to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and with its ruling in Alden v. Maine 14 that the broad principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in state courts as well as federal.
Having previously reserved the question of whether federal statutory rights could be enforced in state courts, 15 the Court in Alden v. Maine 16 held that states could also assert Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in their own courts. Recognizing that the application of the Eleventh Amendment, which limits only the federal courts, was a
misnomer 17 as applied to state courts, the Court nonetheless concluded that the principles of common law sovereign immunity applied absent
compelling evidence that the states had surrendered such by the ratification of the Constitution. Although this immunity is subject to the same limitations as apply in federal courts, the Court’s decision effectively limited the application of significant portions of federal law to state governments. Both Seminole Tribe and Alden were also 5-4 decisions with the four dissenting Justices maintaining that Hans was wrongly decided.
This now-institutionalized 5-4 split continued with Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 18 which held that state sovereign immunity also applies to quasi-judicial proceedings in federal agencies. The operator of a cruise ship devoted to gambling had been denied entry to the Port of Charleston, and subsequently filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission, alleging a violation of the Shipping Act of 1984. 19 Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting justices, emphasized the executive (as opposed to judicial nature) of such agency adjudications, and pointed out that the ultimate enforcement of such proceedings in federal court was exercised by a federal agency (as is allowed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity). The majority, however, while admitting to a
relatively barren historical record, presumed that when a proceeding was
unheard of at the time of the founding of the Constitution, it could not subsequently be applied in derogation of a
State’s dignity within our system of federalism. 20
One view of the Eleventh Amendment, set out above in the discussion of Hans v. Louisiana, Ex parte New York, and Principality of Monaco, is that Chisholm was erroneously decided and that the Amendment’s effect, its express language notwithstanding, was to restore the
original understanding that Article III’s grants of federal court jurisdiction did not extend to suits against the states. It explains the decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 21 in which the Court held that a state could properly raise its Eleventh Amendment defense on appeal after having defended and lost on the merits in the trial court.
[I]t has been well settled . . . that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court. 22 But that the bar is not wholly jurisdictional seems established as well. 23
Moreover, if under Article III there is no jurisdiction of suits against states, the settled principle that states may consent to suit 24 becomes conceptually difficult, as it is not possible to confer jurisdiction where it is lacking through the consent of the parties. 25 And there is jurisdiction under Article III of some suits against states, such as those brought by the United States or by other states. 26 Furthermore, Congress is able in at least some instances to legislate away state immunity, 27 although it may not enlarge Article III jurisdiction. 28 The Court has declared that
the principle of sovereign immunity [reflected in the Eleventh Amendment] is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III, but almost in the same breath has acknowledged that
[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived. 29
Another explanation of the Eleventh Amendment is that it merely recognized the continued vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as established prior to the Constitution: a state was not subject to suit without its consent. 30 This view also has support in modern case law:
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . . 31 The Court in dealing with questions of governmental immunity from suit has traditionally treated interchangeably precedents dealing with state immunity and those dealing with Federal Governmental immunity. 32 Viewing the Amendment and its radiations into Article III in this way provides a consistent explanation of the consent to suit as a waiver. 33 The limited effect of the doctrine in this context in federal court arises from the fact that traditional sovereign immunity arose in a unitary state, barring unconsented suit against a sovereign in its own courts or the courts of another sovereign. But upon entering the Union the states surrendered their sovereignty to some undetermined and changing degree to the national government, a sovereign that does not have plenary power over them but that is more than their coequal. 34
Within the area of federal court jurisdiction, the issue becomes the extent to which the states upon entering the Union gave up their immunity to suit in federal court. Chisholm held, and enactment of the Eleventh Amendment reversed the holding, that the states had given up their immunity to suit in diversity cases based on common law or state law causes of action; Hans v. Louisiana and subsequent cases held that the Amendment in effect codified an understanding of broader immunity to suits based on federal causes of action. 35 Other cases have held that the states did give up their immunity to suits by the United States or by other states and that subjection to suit continues. 36
Still another view of the Eleventh Amendment is that it embodies a state sovereignty principle limiting the power of the Federal Government. 37 In this respect, the federal courts may not act without congressional guidance in subjecting states to suit, and Congress, which can act to the extent of its granted powers, is constrained by judicially created doctrines requiring it to be explicit when it legislates against state immunity. 38
Questions regarding the constitutional dimensions of sovereign immunity have also arisen in the context of interstate sovereign immunity when a private party institutes an action against a state in another state’s court. In the now-overturned 1979 decision of Nevada v. Hall, the Court held that while states are free as a matter of comity “to accord each other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability,” the Constitution does not compel a state to grant another state immunity in its courts. 39 In Hall, California residents who were severely injured in a car crash with a Nevada state university employee on official business sued the university and the State of Nevada in California court. 40 After considering the scope of sovereign immunity as it existed prior to and “in the early days of independence,” the doctrine’s effect on “the framing of the Constitution,” and specific “aspects of the Constitution that qualify the sovereignty of the several States,” such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 41 the Court concluded that “[n]othing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frustrate” California’s policy of “full compensation in its courts for injuries on its highways resulting from the negligence” of state or non-state actors “out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of Nevada.” 42
Forty years later, the Court overruled Hall in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (Franchise Tax Board III), holding that “States retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in the courts of other States.” 43 The case involved a tort action by a private party against a California state agency in Nevada’s courts. 44 The “sole question” before the Court was whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall, a question over which the Court divided in 2016. 45 As the majority in Franchise Tax Board III read the historical record, although interstate sovereign immunity may have existed as a voluntary practice of comity at the time of the founding, the Constitution “fundamentally adjust[ed] the States’ relationship with each other and curtail[ed] their ability, as sovereigns, to decline to recognize each other’s immunity.” 46 The Court reiterated the view embraced in several of its decisions since Hall that in proposing the Eleventh Amendment in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, “Congress acted not to change but to restore the original constitutional design.” 47 Accordingly, the Court explained, the “sovereign immunity of the States . . . neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.” 48 Moreover, the Court reasoned, “[n]umerous provisions” in the Constitution support the view that interstate sovereign immunity is “embe[dded] . . . within the constitutional design.” 49 Among other provisions, the Court cited Article I insofar as it “divests the States of the traditional diplomatic and military tools that foreign sovereigns possess” and Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, which requires that “state-court judgments be accorded full effect in other States and preclude[s] States from ‘adopt[ing] any policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of other States.” 50 Accordingly, because sovereign immunity was inherent in the constitutional design, the Court concluded that the State of California could not be sued in Nevada absent the former state’s consent. 51
Suits Against States
Despite the apparent limitations of the Eleventh Amendment, individuals may, under certain circumstances, bring constitutional and statutory cases against states. In some of these cases, the state's sovereign immunity has either been waived by the state or abrogated by Congress. In other cases, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply because the procedural posture is such that the Court does not view them as being against a state. As discussed below, this latter doctrine is most often seen in suits to enjoin state officials. However, it has also been invoked in bankruptcy and admiralty cases, where the res, or property in dispute, is in fact the legal target of a dispute. 52
The application of this last exception to the bankruptcy area has become less relevant, because even when a bankruptcy case is not focused on a particular res, the Court has held that a state's sovereign immunity is not infringed by being subject to an order of a bankruptcy court.
The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was inserted in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted under its auspices immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena. 53 Thus, where a federal law authorized a bankruptcy trustee to recover
preferential transfers made to state educational institutions, 54 the court held that the sovereign immunity of the state was not infringed despite the fact that the issue was
ancillary to a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction. 55
Because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity inheres in states and not their subdivision or establishments, a state agency that wishes to claim state sovereign immunity must establish that it is acting as an arm of the state:
agencies exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the [Eleventh] Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. 56 In evaluating such a claim, the Court will examine state law to determine the nature of the entity, and whether to treat it as an arm of the state. 57 The Court has consistently refused to extend Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to counties, cities, or towns, 58 even though such political subdivisions exercise a "slice of state power." 59 Even when such entities enjoy immunity from suit under state law, they do not have Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court and the states may not confer it. 60 Similarly, entities created pursuant to interstate compacts (and subject to congressional approval) are not immune from suit, absent a showing that the entity was structured so as to take advantage of the state's constitutional protections. 61