Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
It has long been settled . . . that the term ‘person’ [in the Equal Protection Clause] encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside.1 Thus, one of the earliest equal protection decisions struck down the administration of a facially lawful licensing ordinance that was being applied to discriminate against Chinese.2 In many subsequent cases, however, the Court recognized a permissible state interest in distinguishing between its citizens and aliens by restricting enjoyment of resources and public employment to its own citizens.3 But, in Hirabayashi v. United States,4 the Court announced that
[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry were
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. And, in Korematsu v. United States,5 classifications based upon race and nationality were said to be suspect and subject to the
most rigid scrutiny. These dicta resulted in a 1948 decision that appeared to call into question the rationale of the
particular interest doctrine under which earlier discrimination had been justified. In the 1948 decision, the Court held void a statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons
ineligible to citizenship, which in effect meant resident alien Japanese.6
The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide ‘in any state’ on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws. Justice Black said for the Court that
the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.7
that classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close scrutiny, the Court struck down state statutes which either wholly disqualified resident aliens for welfare assistance or imposed a lengthy durational residency requirement on eligibility.8 Thereafter, in a series of decisions, the Court adhered to its conclusion that alienage was a suspect classification and voided a variety of restrictions. More recently, however, it has created a major
political function exception to strict scrutiny review, which shows some potential of displacing the previous analysis almost entirely.
In Sugarman v. Dougall,9 the Court voided the total exclusion of aliens from a state’s competitive civil service. A state’s power
to preserve the basic conception of a political community enables it to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and voters,10 the Court held, and this power would extend
also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government.11 But a flat ban upon much of the state’s career public service, both of policy-making and non-policy-making jobs, ran afoul of the requirement that in achieving a valid interest through the use of a suspect classification the state must employ means that are precisely drawn in light of the valid purpose.12
State bars against the admission of aliens to the practice of law were also struck down, the Court holding that the state had not met the
heavy burden of showing that its denial of admission to aliens was necessary to accomplish a constitutionally permissible and substantial interest. The state’s admitted interest in assuring the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law could be adequately served by judging applicants on a case-by-case basis and in no sense could the fact that a lawyer is considered to be an officer of the court serve as a valid justification for a flat prohibition.13 Nor could Puerto Rico offer a justification for excluding aliens from one of the
common occupations of the community, hence its bar on licensing aliens as civil engineers was voided.14
In Nyquist v. Mauclet,15 the Court seemed to expand the doctrine. The statute that was challenged restricted the receipt of scholarships and similar financial support to citizens or to aliens who were applying for citizenship or who filed a statement affirming their intent to apply as soon as they became eligible. Therefore, because any alien could escape the limitation by a voluntary act, the disqualification was not aimed at aliens as a class, nor was it based on an immutable characteristic possessed by a
discrete and insular minority – the classification that had been the basis for declaring alienage a suspect category in the first place. But the Court voided the statute.
The important points are that § 661(3) is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class.16 Two proffered justifications were held insufficient to meet the high burden imposed by the strict scrutiny doctrine.
In the following Term, however, the Court denied that every exclusion of aliens was subject to strict scrutiny,
because to do so would ‘obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus deprecate the historic values of citizenship.’17 Upholding a state restriction against aliens qualifying as state policemen, the Court reasoned that the permissible distinction between citizen and alien is that the former
is entitled to participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. Accordingly, we have recognized ‘a State’s historic power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions,’ . . . as part of the sovereign’s obligation ‘to preserve the basic conception of a political community.’18 Discrimination by a state against aliens is not subject to strict scrutiny, but need meet only the rational basis test. It is therefore permissible to reserve to citizens offices having the
most important policy responsibilities, a principle drawn from Sugarman, but the critical factor in this case is its analysis finding that
the police function is . . . one of the basic functions of government . . . . The execution of the broad powers vested in [police officers] affects members of the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life. . . . Clearly the exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can have serious impact on individuals. The office of a policeman is in no sense one of ‘the common occupations of the community.’ . . .19
Continuing to enlarge the exception, the Court in Ambach v. Norwick20 upheld a bar to qualifying as a public school teacher for resident aliens who have not manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. The
governmental function test took on added significance, the Court saying that the
distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of a State.21 Thus,
governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.22 Teachers, the Court thought, because of the role of public education in inculcating civic values and in preparing children for participation in society as citizens and because of the responsibility and discretion they have in fulfilling that role, perform a task that
go[es] to the heart of representative government.23 The citizenship requirement need only bear a rational relationship to the state interest, and the Court concluded it clearly did so.
Then, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,24 the Court, by a 5-to-4 vote, sustained a state law imposing a citizenship requirement upon all positions designated as
peace officers, upholding in context that eligibility prerequisite for probation officers. First, the Court held that the extension of the requirement to an enormous range of people who were variously classified as
peace officers did not reach so far nor was it so broad and haphazard as to belie the claim that the state was attempting to ensure that an important function of government be in the hands of those having a bond of citizenship.
[T]he classifications used need not be precise; there need only be a substantial fit.25 As to the particular positions, the Court held that
they, like the state troopers involved in Foley, sufficiently partake of the sovereign’s power to exercise coercive force over the individual that they may be limited to citizens.26
Thus, the Court so far has drawn a tripartite differentiation with respect to governmental restrictions on aliens. First, it has disapproved the earlier line of cases and now would foreclose attempts by the states to retain certain economic benefits, primarily employment and opportunities for livelihood, exclusively for citizens. Second, when government exercises principally its spending functions, such as those with respect to public employment generally and to eligibility for public benefits, its classifications with an adverse impact on aliens will be strictly scrutinized and usually fail. Third, when government acts in its sovereign capacity – when it acts within its constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities to establish and operate its own government – its decisions with respect to the citizenship qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders will be subject only to traditional rational basis scrutiny.27 However, the
political function standard is elastic, and so long as disqualifications are attached to specific occupations28 rather than to the civil service in general, as in Sugarman, the concept seems capable of encompassing the exclusion.
When confronted with a state statute that authorized local school boards to exclude from public schools children who were not lawfully present in the United States, the Court determined that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate and found that the proffered justifications did not sustain the classification.29 Because it was clear that the children's status as unlawfully present individuals was relevant to valid government goals, and because the Court had previously held that access to education was not a
fundamental interest that triggered strict scrutiny of governmental distinctions relating to education,30 the Court’s decision to accord intermediate review was based upon an amalgam of at least three factors. First, alienage was a characteristic that provokes special judicial protection when used as a basis for discrimination. Second, the children were innocent parties who were having a particular onus imposed on them because of the misconduct of their parents. Third, the total denial of an education to these children would stamp them with an
enduring disability that would harm both them and the state all their lives.31 The Court evaluated each of the state’s attempted justifications and found none of them satisfying the level of review demanded.32 It seems evident that Plyler v. Doe is a unique case and that, whatever it may stand for doctrinally, a sufficiently similar factual situation calling for application of its standards is unlikely to arise.