Amdt14.S1.4.4.4 Collective Bargaining

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

During the Lochner era, liberty of contract, as translated into what one Justice labeled the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage doctrine, 1 was used to strike down legislation calculated to enhance the bargaining capacity of workers as against that already possessed by their employers.

2 The Court did, however, on occasion sustain measures affecting the employment relationship, such as a statute requiring every corporation to furnish a departing employee a letter setting forth the nature and duration of the employee’s service and the true cause for leaving. 3 In Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 4 however, the Court began to show a greater willingness to defer to legislative judgment as to the wisdom and need of such enactments.

The significance of Senn5 was, in part, that the case upheld a statute that was not appreciably different from a statute voided five years earlier in Truax v. Corrigan. 6 In Truax, the Court had found that a statute forbidding injunctions on labor protest activities was unconstitutional as applied to a labor dispute involving picketing, libelous statements, and threats. The statute that the Court subsequently upheld in Senn, by contrast, authorized publicizing labor disputes, declared peaceful picketing and patrolling lawful, and prohibited the granting of injunctions against such conduct. 7 The difference between these statutes, according to the Court, was that the law in Senn applied to peaceful picketing only, whereas the law in Truax was . . . applied to legalize conduct which was not simply peaceful picketing. Because the enhancement of job opportunities for members of the union was a legitimate objective, the state was held competent to authorize the fostering of that end by peaceful picketing, and the fact that the sustaining of the union in its efforts at peaceful persuasion might have the effect of preventing Senn from continuing in business as an independent entrepreneur was declared to present an issue of public policy exclusively for legislative determination.

Years later, after regulations protective of labor allowed unions to amass enormous economic power, many state legislatures attempted to control the abuse of this power, and the Court’s new-found deference to state labor regulation was also applied to restrictions on unions. Thus, the Court upheld state prohibitions on racial discrimination by unions, rejecting claims that the measure interfered unlawfully with the union’s right to choose its members, abridged its property rights, or violated its liberty of contract. Because the union [held] itself out to represent the general business needs of employees and functioned under the protection of the State, the union was deemed to have forfeited the right to claim exemption from legislation protecting workers against discriminatory exclusion. 8

Similarly, state laws outlawing closed shops were upheld in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Company9 and AFL v. American Sash & Door Co.10 When labor unions attempted to invoke freedom of contract, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, announced its refusal to return . . . to . . . [a] due process philosophy that has been deliberately discarded. . . . The due process clause, it maintained, does not forbid a State to pass laws clearly designed to safeguard the opportunity of nonunion workers to get and hold jobs, free from discrimination against them because they are nonunion workers.11

And, in UAW v. WERB, 12 the Court upheld the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, which had been used to proscribe unfair labor practices by a union. In UAW, the union, acting after collective bargaining negotiations had become deadlocked, had attempted to coerce an employer through calling frequent, irregular, and unannounced union meetings during working hours, resulting in a slowdown in production. No one, declared the Court, can question the State’s power to police coercion by . . . methods that involve considerable injury to property and intimidation of other employees by threats.13

Footnotes

  1.  Justice Black in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). In his concurring opinion, contained in the companion case of AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1949), Justice Frankfurter summarized the now obsolete doctrines employed by the Court to strike down state laws fostering unionization. [U]nionization encountered the shibboleths of a premachine age and these were reflected in juridical assumptions that survived the facts on which they were based. Adam Smith was treated as though his generalizations had been imparted to him on Sinai and not as a thinker who addressed himself to the elimination of restrictions which had become fetters upon initiative and enterprise in his day. Basic human rights expressed by the constitutional conception of ‘liberty’ were equated with theories of laissez faire. The result was that economic views of confined validity were treated by lawyers and judges as though the Framers had enshrined them in the Constitution. . . . The attitude which regarded any legislative encroachment upon the existing economic order as infected with unconstitutionality led to disrespect for legislative attempts to strengthen the wage-earners’ bargaining power. With that attitude as a premise, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), followed logically enough; not even Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), could be considered unexpected.
  2.  In Adair and Coppage the Court voided statutes outlawing yellow dog contracts whereby, as a condition of obtaining employment, a worker had to agree not to join or to remain a member of a union; these laws, the Court ruled, impaired the employer’s freedom of contract – the employer’s unrestricted right to hire and fire. In Truax, the Court on similar grounds invalidated an Arizona statute which denied the use of injunctions to employers seeking to restrain picketing and various other communicative actions by striking employees. And in Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); 267 U.S. 552 (1925) and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), the Court had also ruled that a statute compelling employers and employees to submit their controversies over wages and hours to state arbitration was unconstitutional as part of a system compelling employers and employees to continue in business on terms not of their own making.
  3.  Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). Added provisions that such letters should be on plain paper selected by the employee, signed in ink and sealed, and free from superfluous figures and words, were also sustained as not amounting to any unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and property. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922). In conjunction with its approval of this statute, the Court also sanctioned judicial enforcement of a local policy rule which rendered illegal an agreement of several insurance companies having a local monopoly of a line of insurance, to the effect that no company would employ within two years anyone who had been discharged from, or left, the service of any of the others. On the ground that the right to strike is not absolute, the Court in a similar manner upheld a statute under which a labor union official was punished for having ordered a strike for the purpose of coercing an employer to pay a wage claim of a former employee. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
  4.  301 U.S. 486 (1937).
  5.  301 U.S. 468 (1937).
  6.  257 U.S. 312 (1921).
  7.  The statute was applied to deny an injunction to a tiling contractor being picketed by a union because he refused to sign a closed shop agreement containing a provision requiring him to abstain from working in his own business as a tile layer or helper.
  8.  Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945). Justice Frankfurter, concurring, declared that the insistence by individuals of their private prejudices . . . , in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts. Id. at 98.
  9.  335 U.S. 525 (1949).
  10.  335 U.S. 538 (1949).
  11.  335 U.S. at 534, 537. In a lengthy opinion, in which he registered his concurrence with both decisions, Justice Frankfurter set forth extensive statistical data calculated to prove that labor unions not only were possessed of considerable economic power but by virtue of such power were no longer dependent on the closed shop for survival. He would therefore leave to the legislatures the determination whether it is preferable in the public interest that trade unions should be subjected to state intervention or left to the free play of social forces, whether experience has disclosed ‘union unfair labor practices,’ and if so, whether legislative correction is more appropriate than self-discipline and pressure of public opinion. . . . Id. at 538, 549-50.
  12.  336 U.S. 245 (1949).
  13.  336 U.S. at 253. See also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (upholding state law forbidding agreements in restraint of trade as applied to union ice peddlers picketing wholesale ice distributor to induce the latter not to sell to nonunion peddlers). Other cases regulating picketing are treated under the First Amendment topics, Picketing and Boycotts by Labor Unions and Public Issue Picketing and Parading, supra.