Amdt14.S1.6.1 Generally: The Principle of Fundamental Fairness

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Court has held that practically all the criminal procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights – the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments – are fundamental to state criminal justice systems and that the absence of one or the other particular guarantees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 In addition, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects against practices and policies that violate precepts of fundamental fairness, 2 even if they do not violate specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 3 The standard query in such cases is whether the challenged practice or policy violates a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government.4

This inquiry contains a historical component, as recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental – whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. . . . [Therefore, the limitations imposed by the Court on the states are] not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but [are] fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States.5

Footnotes

  1.  See analysis under the Bill of Rights, Fourteenth Amendment, supra.
  2.  For instance, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that, despite the absence of a specific constitutional provision requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, such proof is required by due process. For other recurrences to general due process reasoning, as distinct from reliance on more specific Bill of Rights provisions, see, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15-420, slip op. at 15-16 (2016) (holding that principles of due process did not prevent a defendant’s prior uncounseled convictions in tribal court from being used as the basis for a sentence enhancement, as those convictions complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, which itself contained requirements that ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions). See also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (where sentencing enhancement scheme for habitual offenders found unconstitutional, defendant’s sentence cannot be sustained, even if sentence falls within range of unenhanced sentences); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (conclusive presumptions in jury instruction may not be used to shift burden of proof of an element of crime to defendant); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (fairness of failure to give jury instruction on presumption of innocence evaluated under totality of circumstances); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (requiring, upon defense request, jury instruction on presumption of innocence); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (defendant may be required to bear burden of affirmative defense); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (sufficiency of jury instructions); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (a state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (defendant may not be required to carry the burden of disproving an element of a crime for which he is charged); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (defendant may not be held to rule requiring disclosure to prosecution of an alibi defense unless defendant is given reciprocal discovery rights against the state); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant may not be denied opportunity to explore confession of third party to crime for which defendant is charged).
  3.  Justice Black thought the Fourteenth Amendment should be limited to the specific guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (dissenting). For Justice Harlan’s response, see id. at 372 n.5 (concurring).
  4.  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). The question is phrased as whether a claimed right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, whether it partakes of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or whether it offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
  5.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).