Amdt1.2.7 Right of Association

First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. . . . Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.1 It appears from the Court’s opinions that the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition, 2 although it has at times been referred to as an independent freedom protected by the First Amendment. 3 The doctrine is a fairly recent construction, the problems associated with it having previously arisen primarily in the context of loyalty-security investigations of Communist Party membership, and these cases having been resolved without giving rise to any separate theory of association. 4

Freedom of association as a concept thus grew out of a series of cases in the 1950s and 1960s in which certain states were attempting to curb the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In the first case, the Court unanimously set aside a contempt citation imposed after the organization refused to comply with a court order to produce a list of its members within the state. Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.5 [T]hese indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association,6 may be abridged by governmental action either directly or indirectly, wrote Justice Harlan, and the state had failed to demonstrate a need for the lists which would outweigh the harm to associational rights which disclosure would produce.

Applying the concept in subsequent cases, the Court, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 7 again held that the disclosure of membership lists, because of the harm to the right of association, could be compelled only upon a showing of a subordinating interest; ruled in Shelton v. Tucker8 that, though a state had a broad interest to inquire into the fitness of its school teachers, that interest did not justify a regulation requiring all teachers to list all organizations to which they had belonged within the previous five years; again struck down an effort to compel membership lists from the NAACP; 9 and overturned a state court order barring the NAACP from doing any business within the state because of alleged improprieties. 10 Certain of the activities condemned in the latter case, the Court said, were protected by the First Amendment and, though other actions might not have been, the state could not infringe on the right of association by ousting the organization altogether. 11

A state order prohibiting the NAACP from urging persons to seek legal redress for alleged wrongs and from assisting and representing such persons in litigation opened up new avenues when the Court struck the order down as violating the First Amendment. 12 [A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. . . . In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. . . .

We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.13 This decision was followed in three cases in which the Court held that labor unions enjoyed First Amendment protection in assisting their members in pursuing their legal remedies to recover for injuries and other actions. In the first case, the union advised members to seek legal advice before settling injury claims and recommended particular attorneys; 14 in the second the union retained attorneys on a salaried basis to represent members; 15 in the third, the union recommended certain attorneys whose fee would not exceed a specified percentage of the recovery. 16 Justice Black wrote: [T]he First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the rights to cooperate in helping and advising one another in asserting their rights. . . .17

Thus, a right to associate to further political and social views is protected against unreasonable burdening, 18 but the evolution of this right in recent years has passed far beyond the relatively narrow contexts in which it was born.

Social contacts that do not occur in the context of an organized association may be unprotected, however. In holding that a state may restrict admission to certain licensed dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18, the Court declared that there is no generalized right of ‘social association’ that includes chance encounters in dance halls.19

In a series of three decisions, the Court explored the extent to which associational rights may be burdened by nondiscrimination requirements. First, Roberts v. United States Jaycees20 upheld application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit the United States Jaycees from excluding women from full membership. Three years later in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 21 the Court applied Roberts in upholding application of a similar California law to prevent Rotary International from excluding women from membership. Then, in New York State Club Ass’n v. New York City, 22 the Court upheld against facial challenge New York City’s Human Rights Law, which prohibits race, creed, sex, and other discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement, and applies to clubs of more than 400 members providing regular meal service and supported by nonmembers for trade or business purposes. In Roberts, both the Jaycees’ nearly indiscriminate membership requirements and the state’s compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination against women were important to the Court’s analysis. The Court found that the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups, age and sex being the only established membership criteria in organizations otherwise entirely open to public participation. The Jaycees, therefore, lack the distinctive characteristics [e.g., small size, identifiable purpose, selectivity in membership, perhaps seclusion from the public eye] that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women.23 Similarly, the Court determined in Rotary International that Rotary Clubs, designed as community service organizations representing a cross section of business and professional occupations, also do not represent the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection.24 And, in New York City, the fact that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under the Court's decisions in Rotary and Roberts, and the fact that the clubs were 'commercial' in nature, helped to defeat the facial challenge. 25

Some amount of First Amendment protection is still due such organizations; the Jaycees had taken public positions on a number of issues, and, the Court in Roberts noted, regularly engage[d] in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment. There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.26 Moreover, the state had a compelling interest to prevent . . . acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages. . . .27

Because of the near-public nature of the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs – the Court in Roberts likening the situation to a large business attempting to discriminate in hiring or in selection of customers – the cases may be limited in application, and should not be read as governing membership discrimination by private social clubs. 28 In New York City, the Court noted that opportunities for individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth . . . will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts.29

When application of a public accommodations law was viewed as impinging on an organization’s ability to present its message, the Court found a First Amendment violation. Massachusetts could not require the private organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade to allow a group of gays and lesbians to march as a unit proclaiming its members’ gay and lesbian identity, the Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group. 30 To do so would require parade organizers to promote a message they did not wish to promote. Roberts and New York City were distinguished as not involving a trespass on the organization’s message itself.31 Those cases stood for the proposition that the state could require equal access for individuals to what was considered the public benefit of organization membership. But even if individual access to the parade might similarly be mandated, the Court reasoned, the gay group could nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club’s existing members.32

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 33 the Court held that application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts of America to admit an avowed homosexual as an adult member violated the organization’s First Amendment right of expressive association.34 Citing Hurley, the Court held that [t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.35 The Boy Scouts, the Court found, engages in expressive activity in seeking to transmit a system of values, which include being morally straight and clean.36 The Court accept[ed] the Boy Scouts’ assertion that the organization teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally straight. 37 The Court also gave deference to [the] association’s view of what would impair its expression.38 Allowing a gay rights activist to serve in the Scouts would force the organization to send a message . . . that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.39

Political Association

The major expansion of the right of association has occurred in the area of political rights. There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of ‘orderly group activity’ protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.40 Usually in combination with an equal protection analysis, the Court since Williams v. Rhodes41 has passed on numerous state restrictions that limit the ability of individuals or groups to join one or the other of the major parties or to form and join an independent political party to further political, social, and economic goals. 42 Of course, the right is not absolute. The Court has recognized that there must be substantial state regulation of the election process, which will necessarily burden the individual’s right to vote and to join with others for political purposes. The validity of governmental regulation must be determined by assessing the degree of infringement of the right of association against the legitimacy, strength, and necessity of the governmental interests and the means of implementing those interests. 43 Many restrictions upon political association have survived this sometimes-exacting standard of review, in large measure upon the basis of some of the governmental interests having been found compelling. 44

If people have a First Amendment right to associate with others to form a political party, then it follows that [a] political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the State gives a party a role in the election process – as . . . by giving certain parties the right to have their candidates appear on the general-election ballot. Then, for example, the party's racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment. And then also the State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the fairness of the party's nominating process, enabling it to prescribe what that process must be.45

A political party's First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes does not render invalid a state statute that allows a candidate to designate his party preference on a ballot, even when the candidate is unaffiliated with, or even repugnant to, the party he designates. 46 This is because the statute in question never refers to the candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such; it merely allows them to indicate their party preference. 47 The Court acknowledged that it is possible that voters will misinterpret the candidates' party-preference designations as reflecting endorsement by the parties, but whether voters will be confused by the party-preference designations will depend in significant part on the form of the ballot.48 If the form of the ballot used in a particular election is such as to confuse voters, then an as-applied challenge to the statute may be appropriate, but a facial challenge, the Court held, is not. 49

A significant extension of First Amendment association rights in the political context occurred when the Court curtailed the already limited political patronage system. At first holding that a non-policymaking, nonconfidential government employee cannot be discharged from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs or affiliations, 50 the Court subsequently held that the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.51 The Court thus abandoned the concept of policymaking, confidential positions, noting that some such positions would nonetheless be protected, whereas some people filling positions not reached by the description would not be. 52 The Court's opinion makes it difficult to evaluate the ramifications of the decision, but it seems clear that a majority of the Justices adhere to a doctrine of broad associational political freedom that will have substantial implications for governmental employment. Refusing to confine Elrod and Branti to their facts, the court in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois53 held that restrictions on patronage apply not only to dismissal or its substantial equivalent, but also to promotion, transfer, recall after layoffs, and hiring of low-level public employees. In 1996, the Court extended Elrod and Branti to protect independent government contractors. 54

The protected right of association enables a political party to assert against some state regulation an overriding interest sufficient to overcome the legitimate interests of the governing body. Thus, a Wisconsin law that mandated an open primary election, with party delegates bound to support at the national convention the wishes of the voters expressed in that primary election, although legitimate and valid in and of itself, had to yield to a national party rule providing for the acceptance of delegates chosen only in an election limited to those voters who affiliated with the party. 55

Provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act requiring the reporting and disclosure of contributions and expenditures to and by political organizations, including the maintenance by such organizations of records of everyone contributing more than $10 and the reporting by individuals and groups that are not candidates or political committees who contribute or expend more than $100 a year for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of an identified candidate, were sustained. 56 [C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . We long have recognized the significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest. . . . We have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny. We have also insisted that there be a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.57 The governmental interests effectuated by these requirements – providing the electorate with information, deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption, and gathering data necessary to detect violations – were found to be of sufficient magnitude to be validated even though they might incidentally deter some persons from contributing. 58 A claim that contributions to minor parties and independents should have a blanket exemption from disclosure was rejected inasmuch as an injury was highly speculative; but any such party making a showing of a reasonable probability that compelled disclosure of contributors’ names would subject them to threats or reprisals could obtain an exemption from the courts. 59 The Buckley Court also narrowly construed the requirement of reporting independent contributions and expenditures in order to avoid constitutional problems. 60

Conflict Between Organization and Members

It is to be expected that disputes will arise between an organization and some of its members, and that First Amendment principles may be implicated. Of course, unless there is some governmental connection, there will be no federal constitutional application to any such controversy. 61 But, in at least some instances, when government compels membership in an organization or in some manner lends its authority to such compulsion, there may be constitutional limitations. For example, such limitations can arise in connection with union shop labor agreements permissible under the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act. 62

Union shop agreements generally require, as a condition of employment, membership in the union on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of employment. In Railway Employes' Dep’t v. Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such agreements, noting that the record in the case did not indicate that union dues were being used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, such as by being spent to support political candidates. 63 In International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, where union dues had been collected pursuant to a union shop agreement and had been spent to support political candidates, the Court avoided the First Amendment issue by construing the Railway Labor Act to prohibit the use of compulsory union dues for political causes. 64

The Supreme Court held in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, that "public sector agency-shop arrangements violate the First Amendment,"  65 overruling a forty-year old precedent, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, that had generally approved of such arrangements.  66 However, even Abood itself had only permitted some aspects of compelled fee regimes,  67 and the Court had, for years prior to Janus, signaled its growing discomfort with Abood.  68 Understanding the historical course of the jurisprudence governing compelled agency fees is important to understand the ramifications of Janus.

In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 69 the Court found Hanson and Street applicable to the public employment context. 70 Recognizing that any system of compelled support restricted employees' right not to associate and not to support, the Court nonetheless found the governmental interests served by an agency shop agreement 71 – the promotion of labor peace and stability of employer-employee relations – to be of overriding importance and to justify the impact upon employee freedom. 72 But the Court drew a different balance when it considered whether employees compelled to support the union were constitutionally entitled to object to the use of those exacted funds to support political candidates or to advance ideological causes not germane to the union’s duties as collective-bargaining representative. To compel one to expend funds in such a way is to violate his freedom of belief and the right to act on those beliefs just as much as if government prohibited him from acting to further his own beliefs. 73 The remedy, however, was not to restrain the union from making non-collective-bargaining-related expenditures, but was to require that those funds come only from employees who do not object. Therefore, the lower courts were directed to oversee development of a system under which employees could object generally to such use of union funds and could obtain either a proportionate refund or a reduction of future exactions. 74 Later, the Court further tightened the requirements. A proportionate refund is inadequate because even then the union obtains an involuntary loan for purposes to which the employee objects; 75 an advance reduction of dues corrects the problem only if accompanied by sufficient information by which employees may gauge the propriety of the union’s fee. 76 Therefore, the union procedure must also provide for a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker.77

In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n, 78 the Court noted that, although Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson had set forth various procedural requirements that public-sector unions collecting agency fees must observe in order to ensure that an objecting nonmember can prevent the use of his fees for impermissible purposes,79 it never suggested that the First Amendment is implicated whenever governments place limitations on a union's entitlement to agency fees above and beyond what Abood and Hudson require. To the contrary, we have described Hudson as 'outlin[ing] a minimum set of procedures by which a [public-sector] union in an agency-shop relationship could meet its requirements under Abood.'80 Thus, the Court held in Davenport that the State of Washington could prohibit expenditure of a nonmember's agency fees for election-related purposes unless the nonmember affirmatively consents.81 The Court added that Washington could have gone much further, restricting public-sector agency fees to the portion of union dues devoted to collective bargaining. Indeed, it is uncontested that it would be constitutional for Washington to eliminate agency fees entirely.82

And then, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 83 the Court did suggest constitutional limits on a public union assessing political fees in an agency shop other than through a voluntary opt in system. The union in Knox had proposed and implemented a special fee to fund political advocacy before providing formal notice with an opportunity for non-union employees to opt out. Five Justices characterized agency shop arrangements in the public sector as constitutionally problematic in the first place, and, then, charged that requiring non-union members to affirmatively opt out of contributing to political activities was a remarkable boon for unions. Continuing to call opt-out arrangements impingements on the First Amendment rights of non-union members, the majority more specifically held that the Constitution required that separate notices be sent out for special political assessments that allowed non-union employees to opt in rather than requiring them to opt out. 84 Two concurring Justices, echoed by the dissenters, heavily criticized the majority for reaching significant constitutional issues not contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued. Rather, the concurrence more narrowly found that unions may not collect special political assesments from non-union members who earlier objected to nonchargeable (i.e., political) expenses, and could only collect from nonobjecting nonmembers after giving notice and an opportunity to opt out. 85

Doubts on the constitutionality of mandatory union dues in the public sector intensified in Harris v. Quinn.  86 The Court openly expressed reservations on Abood's central holding that the collection of an agency fee from public employees withstood First Amendment scrutiny because of the desirability of "labor peace" and the problem of "free ridership." Specifically, the Court questioned (1) the scope of the precedents (like Hanson and Street) that the Abood Court relied on; (2) Abood's failure to appreciate the distinctly political context of public sector unions; and (3) Abood's dismissal of the administrative difficulties in distinguishing between public union expenditures for collective bargaining and expenditures for political purposes.  87 Notwithstanding these concerns about Abood's core holding, the Court in Harris declined to overturn Abood outright. Instead, the Court focused on the peculiar status of the employees at issue in the case before it: home health care assistants subsidized by Medicaid. These "partial-public employees" were under the direction and control of their individual clients and not the state, had little direct interaction with state agencies or employees, and derived only limited benefits from the union.  88 As a consequence, the Court concluded that Abood,'s rationale—the labor peace and free rider concerns—did not justify compelling dissenting home health care assistants to subsidize union speech.  89

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the Supreme Court formally overruled Abood and held "that public sector agency-shop arrangements violate the First Amendment."  90 The Court rejected the governmental interests said to justify the compelled fees in Abood holding that labor peace can be achieved through less restrictive means and that the government does not have a "compelling interest" in avoiding free riders.  91 The majority opinion criticized Abood''s extension of Hanson and Street, saying neither of those cases "gave careful consideration to the First Amendment" and arguing that Abood's reliance on those cases led it to apply an overly deferential standard to analyze public-sector agency fee arrangements.  92 In the Court's view, granting too much deference to legislative judgments about the strength of asserted government interests or about whether the challenged action truly supports those interests "is inappropriate in deciding free speech issues."  93 The Court also disagreed with additional justifications said to justify the agency-shop arrangements, notably holding that they could not be upheld under Pickering v. Board of Education,  94 a case in which the Court acknowledged that public employers may sometimes place certain restrictions on employees' speech.  95 Accordingly, after Janus, "States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees."  96

In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass'n, 97 the Court upheld an Idaho statute that prohibited payroll deductions for union political activities. Because the statute did not restrict political speech, but merely declined to subsidize it by providing for payroll deductions, the state did not abridge the union's First Amendment right and therefore could justify the ban merely by demonstrating a rational basis for it. The Court found that it was justified by the State's interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.98

The Court has held that a labor relations body may not prevent a union member or employee represented exclusively by a union from speaking out at a public meeting on an issue of public concern, simply because the issue was a subject of collective bargaining between the union and the employer. 99

Footnotes

  1.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
  2.  357 U.S. at 460; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1971); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
  3.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461, 463 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981).
  4.  See Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment, infra.
  5.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
  6.  357 U.S. at 461.
  7.  361 U.S. 516 (1960).
  8.  364 U.S. 479 (1960).
  9.  Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
  10.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
  11.  377 U.S. at 308, 309.
  12.  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
  13.  371 U.S. at 429-30. Button was applied in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), in which the Court found foreclosed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments the discipline visited upon a volunteer lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union who had solicited someone to use the ACLU to bring suit to contest the sterilization of Medicaid recipients. Both the NAACP and the ACLU were organizations that engaged in extensive litigation as well as lobbying and educational activities, all of which were means of political expression. [T]he efficacy of litigation as a means of advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal assistance available to suitable litigants. Id. at 431. [C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 426. However, ordinary law practice for commercial ends is not given special protection. A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977), and see the comparison of Ohralik and Bates in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 296-98 (2007) (solicitation ban was more akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction).
  14.  Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
  15.  United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
  16.  United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
  17.  401 U.S. at 578-79. These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that individuals are always entitled to representation of counsel in administrative proceedings. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (upholding limitation to $10 of fee that may be paid attorney in representing veterans’ death or disability claims before VA).
  18.  E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-15 (1982) (concerted activities of group protesting racial bias); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (denial of official recognition to student organization by public college without justification abridged right of association). The right does not, however, protect the decision of entities not truly private to exclude minorities. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973); Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
  19.  City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 25 (1989). The narrow factual setting – a restriction on adults dancing with teenagers in public – may be contrasted with the Court’s broad assertion that coming together to engage in recreational dancing . . . is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 25.
  20.  468 U.S. 609 (1984).
  21.  481 U.S. 537 (1987).
  22.  487 U.S. 1 (1988).
  23.  468 U.S. at 621.
  24.  481 U.S. at 546.
  25.  487 U.S. at 11-12.
  26.  468 U.S. at 626-27 (citations omitted).
  27.  468 U.S. at 628.
  28.  The Court in Rotary rejected an assertion that Roberts had recognized that Kiwanis Clubs are constitutionally distinguishable, and suggested that a case-by-case approach is necessary to determine whether the ‘zone of privacy’ extends to a particular club or entity. 481 U.S. at 547 n.6.
  29.  487 U.S. at 15.
  30.  514 U.S. 334 (1995).
  31.  515 U.S. at 580.
  32.  515 U.S. at 580-81.
  33.  530 U.S. 640 (2000).
  34.  530 U.S. at 644.
  35.  530 U.S. at 648.
  36.  530 U.S. at 650.
  37.  530 U.S. at 651.
  38.  530 U.S. at 653.
  39.  530 U.S. at 653. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006), the Court held that the Solomon Amendment's forcing law schools to allow military recruiters on campus does not violate the schools' freedom of expressive association because [r]ecruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students – not to become members of the school's expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school 'to accept members it does not desire.' Rumsfeld is discussed below under Government and the Power of the Purse. See also Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate?: How the Case of Boy Scouts of American v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (Yale University Press, 2009).
  40.  Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (citation omitted).
  41.  393 U.S. 23 (1968).
  42.  E.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (time deadline for enrollment in party in order to vote in next primary); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (barring voter from party primary if he voted in another party’s primary within preceding 23 months); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (ballot access restriction); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (number of signatures to get party on ballot); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (limit on contributions to associations formed to support or oppose referendum measure); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (resign-to-run law).
  43.  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-143 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183 (1979).
  44.  Thus, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974), the Court found compelling the state interest in achieving stability through promotion of the two-party system, and upheld a bar on any independent candidate who had been affiliated with any other party within one year. Compare Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968) (casting doubt on state interest in promoting Republican and Democratic voters). The state interest in protecting the integrity of political parties was held to justify requiring enrollment of a person in the party up to eleven months before a primary election, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), but not to justify requiring one to forgo one election before changing parties. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). See also Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (efficient operation of government justifies limits on employee political activity); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982) (permitting political party to designate replacement in office vacated by elected incumbent of that party serves valid governmental interests). Storer v. Brown was distinguished in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), holding invalid a requirement that independent candidates for President and Vice-President file nominating petitions by March 20 in order to qualify for the November ballot; state interests in assuring voter education, treating all candidates equally (candidates participating in a party primary also had to declare candidacy in March), and preserving political stability, were deemed insufficient to justify the substantial impediment to independent candidates and their supporters. See also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (state interests are insubstantial in imposing closed primary under which a political party is prohibited from allowing independents to vote in its primaries); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 (2000) (requirement of a blanket primary, in which all registered voters, regardless of political affiliation, may participate, unconstitutionally forces political parties to associate with – to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by – those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival.); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (Oklahoma statute that allowed only registered members of a political party, and registered independents, to vote in the party's primary does not violate freedom of association; Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system distinguished from Connecticut's closed primary that the Court struck down in Tashjian).
  45.  New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797-98 (2008) (citations omitted). In Lopez Torres, the Court upheld a state statute that required political parties to select judicial candidates at a convention of delegates chosen by party members in a primary election, rather than to select candidates in direct primary elections. The statute was challenged by party members who had not been selected and who claimed that the convention process that follows the delegate election does not give them a realistic chance to secure the party's nomination. Id. at 799. The Court rejected their challenge, holding that, although a state may require party-candidate selection through processes more favorable to insurgents, such as primaries, id. at 799, the Constitution does not demand that a state do so. Party conventions, with their attendant 'smoke-filled rooms' and domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting party candidates. Id. at 799. The plaintiffs had an associational right to join the party but not to have a certain degree of influence in the party. Id. at 798.
  46.  Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (2008). This was a 7-to-2 decision written by Justice Thomas, with Justices Scalia and Kennedy dissenting.
  47.  128 S. Ct. at 1192.
  48.  128 S. Ct. at 1193. The Court saw simply no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate will interpret a candidate's party preference designation to mean that the candidate is the party's chosen nominee or representative or that the party associates with or approves of the candidate. Id.
  49.  A ballot could avoid confusion by, for example, includ[ing] prominent disclaimers explaining that party preference reflects only the self-designation of the candidate and not an official endorsement by the party. 128 S. Ct. at 1194. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy in dissent, wrote that [a]n individual's endorsement of a party shapes the voter's view of what the party stands for, and that it is quite impossible for the ballot to satisfy a reasonable voter that the candidate is 'not associated' with the party for which he has expressed a preference. Id. at 1200.
  50.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The limited concurrence of Justices Stewart and Blackmun provided the qualification for an otherwise expansive plurality opinion. Id. at 374.
  51.  Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). On the same page, the Court refers to a position in which party membership was essential to the discharge of the employee’s governmental responsibilities. (Emphasis added.) A great gulf separates appropriate from essential, so that much depends on whether the Court was using the two words interchangeably or whether the stronger word was meant to characterize the position noted and not to particularize the standard.
  52.  Justice Powell’s dissents in both cases contain lengthy treatments of and defenses of the patronage system as a glue strengthening necessary political parties. 445 U.S. at 520.
  53.  497 U.S. 62 (1990). Rutan was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Brennan writing the Court’s opinion. The four dissenters indicated, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, that they would not only rule differently in Rutan, but that they would also overrule Elrod and Branti.
  54.  O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (allegation that city removed petitioner’s company from list of those offered towing business on a rotating basis, in retaliation for petitioner’s refusal to contribute to mayor’s campaign, and for his support of mayor’s opponent, states a cause of action under the First Amendment); Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (termination or non-renewal of a public contract in retaliation for the contractor’s speech on a matter of public concern can violate the First Amendment).
  55.  Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). See also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (party rules, not state law, governed which delegation from state would be seated at national convention; national party had protected associational right to sit delegates it chose).
  56.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976).
  57.  424 U.S. at 64 (footnote citations omitted).
  58.  424 U.S. at 66-68.
  59.  424 U.S. at 68-74. Such a showing, based on past governmental and private hostility and harassment, was made in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
  60.  424 U.S. at 74-84.
  61.  The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 537, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-413, enacted a bill of rights for union members, designed to protect, among other things, freedom of speech and assembly and the right to participate in union meetings on political and economic subjects.
  62.  Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), permits the negotiation of union shop agreements. Such agreements, however, may be outlawed by state right to work laws. Section 14(b), 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). In industries covered by the Railway Labor Act, union shop agreements may be negotiated regardless of contrary state laws. 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh; see Railway Employes' Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
  63.  351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
  64.  367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961). Justices Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, and Harlan would have reached the constitutional issue, with differing results. On the same day that it decided Street, the Court, in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), declined to reach the constitutional issues presented by roughly the same fact situation in a suit by lawyers compelled to join an integrated bar. These issues, however, were faced squarely in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990), which held that an integrated state bar may not, against a members’ wishes, devote compulsory dues to ideological or other political activities not necessarily or reasonably related to the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal service available to the people of the State.
  65.  585 U.S. ___, No. 16-1466, slip op. at 33 (2018).
  66.  431 U.S. 209, 229 (1977).
  67.  Id. at 235.
  68.  See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. ___, No. 11-681, slip op. (2014). In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association the Court was equally divided on the question of whether to overrule Abood. 578 U.S. ___, No. 14-915, slip op. at 1 (2016).
  69.  431 U.S. 209 (1977).
  70.  That a public entity was the employer and the employees consequently were public employees was deemed constitutionally immaterial for the application of the principles of Hanson and Street, id. at 226-32, but, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell found the distinction between public and private employment crucial. Id. at 244.
  71.  An agency shop agreement requires all employees, regardless of union membership, to pay a fee to the union that reflects the union's efforts in obtaining employment benefits through collective bargaining. The Court in Abood noted that it is the practical equivalent of a union shop agreement. 431 U.S. at 217 n.10.
  72.  431 U.S. at 217-23. For a similar argument over the issue of corporate political contributions and shareholder rights, see First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978), and id. at 802, 812-21 (Justice White dissenting).
  73.  431 U.S. at 232-37.
  74.  431 U.S. at 237-42. On the other hand, nonmembers may be charged for such general union expenses as contributions to state and national affiliates, expenses of sending delegates to state and national union conventions, and costs of a union newsletter. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). A local union may also charge nonmembers a fee that goes to the national union to pay for litigation expenses incurred on behalf of other local units, but only if (1) the litigation is related to collective bargaining rather than political activity, and (2) the litigation charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., other locals contribute similarly. Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 802 (2009).
  75.  Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984).
  76.  Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
  77.  475 U.S. at 309.
  78.  551 U.S. 177 (2007).
  79.  551 U.S. at 181, citing 475 U.S. 292, 302, 304-310.
  80.  551 U.S. at 185, quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990), and adding emphasis.
  81.  551 U.S. at 184.
  82.  551 U.S. at 184 (citations omitted).
  83.   567 U.S. ___, No. 10-1121, slip op. (2012).
  84.  Id. at 17 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
  85.  567 U.S. ___, No. 10-1121, slip op. (2012) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring).
  86.  573 U.S. ___, No. 11-681, slip op. (2014).
  87.  Id. at 8–20.
  88.  Id. at 24–27.
  89.  Id. at 27.
  90.  585 U.S. ___, No. 16-1466, slip op. at 33 (2018).
  91.  Id. at 12–13.
  92.  Id. at 36.
  93.  Id. at 37.
  94.  391 U.S. 563 (1968).
  95.  Janus, slip op. at 26.
  96.  Id. at 48.
  97.  129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
  98.  129 S. Ct. at 1098. The unions had argued that, even if the limitation was valid as applied at the state level, it violated their First Amendment rights when applied to local public employers. The Court held that a political subdivision, created by the state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator. Id. at 1101, quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933).
  99.  Madison School Dist. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).