Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The Court has also considered whether, based on the nature of the underlying offense (or, as explored in the next topic, the capacity of the defendant), the imposition of capital punishment may be inappropriate in particular cases.
[T]he Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic 'precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.' Whether this requirement has been fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that 'currently prevail.' The Amendment 'draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'1 However, the
Court has . . . made it clear that '[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions.'2
In Coker v. Georgia,3 the Court held that the state may not impose a death sentence upon a rapist who did not take a human life. In Kennedy v. Louisiana,4 the Court held that this was true even when the rape victim was a child.5 In Coker the Court announced that the standard under the Eighth Amendment was that punishments are barred when they
are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed. Under Gregg, a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the test on either ground. Furthermore, these Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. To this end, attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.6 Although the Court thought that the death penalty for rape passed the first test (
it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment),7 it found that it failed the second test (proportionality). Georgia was the sole state providing for death for the rape of an adult woman, and juries in at least nine out of ten cases refused to impose death for rape. Aside from this view of public perception, the Court independently concluded that death is an excessive penalty for an offender who rapes but does not kill; rape cannot compare with murder
in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public.8 In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court found that both
evolving standards of decency and
a national consensus preclude the death penalty for a person who rapes a child.9
Applying the Coker analysis, the Court ruled in Enmund v. Florida10 that death is an unconstitutional penalty for felony murder if the defendant did not himself kill, or attempt to take life, or intend that anyone be killed. Although a few more states imposed capital punishment in felony murder cases than had imposed it for rape, nonetheless the weight was heavily against the practice, and the evidence of jury decisions and other indicia of a modern consensus also opposed the death penalty in such circumstances. Moreover, the Court determined that death was a disproportionate sentence for one who neither took life nor intended to do so. Because the death penalty is likely to deter only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation, and because the justification of retribution depends upon the degree of the defendant’s culpability, the imposition of death upon one who participates in a crime in which a victim is murdered by one of his confederates and not as a result of his own intention serves neither of the purposes underlying the penalty.11 In Tison v. Arizona, however, the Court eased the
intent to kill requirement, holding that, in keeping with an
apparent consensus among the states,
major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.12