ArtIII.S2.C1.2 Mootness Doctrine

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:

The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

The mootness doctrine imposes another limitation derived from Article III's case-or-controversy requirement  1 on the federal courts' jurisdiction to resolve disputes.  2 "It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority 'to give opinions upon moot questions;'"  3 that is, "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome."  4 "An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation."  5 Thus, "if an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit[]' at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot."  6 According to the Supreme Court, "a case that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is 'no longer a "Case" or "Controversy" for purposes of Article III,' and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts."  7 Because mootness is a jurisdictional limitation, a federal court canand indeed mustdismiss a moot case even if none of the parties ask the court to do so.  8 In this respect, mootness "bears close affinity to" the other justiciability doctrines derived from Article III of the Constitution,  9 including standing  10 and the prohibition against advisory opinions.  11 As explained below, the Supreme Court has steadily developed the substantive and procedural aspects of the mootness doctrine over the course of nearly a century and a half. In doing so, however, the Court has also recognized a variety of limited circumstances in which the mootness doctrine does not apply with its usual force.

Early Mootness Doctrine

The Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Mills v. Green  12 is the Court's first opinion directly addressing the mootness doctrine.  13 Mills involved the election of delegates to a convention to revise South Carolina's constitution.  14 A South Carolina citizen filed suit, claiming that the state's voter registration statutes unconstitutionally "abridg[ed], imped[ed], and destroy[ed] the suffrage of citizens of the state and of the United States."  15 While the case was pending on appeal, however, the date of the election passed, the delegates were selected, and the constitutional convention had assembled.  16 The Supreme Court therefore concluded that there was no longer any "actual controversy involving real and substantial rights between the parties" and dismissed the appeal accordingly.  17 The Court first explained that the federal judiciary's "duty" was only "to decide actual controversies," not "to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."  18 Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court emphasized that "the whole object of the [plaintiff's lawsuit] was to secure a right to vote at the election."  19 Because the Court could not retroactively make the plaintiff eligible to vote in an election that had already occurred, the Court concluded it was unable to grant the plaintiff the relief he sought.  20 Mills therefore firmly established the legal principle that otherwise justiciable cases may become nonjusticiable with the passage of time.  21

Notably, however, the Mills Court did not expressly base its holding on Article III's "case or controversy" requirement; nothing in Mills squarely suggested that the mootness doctrine was a constitutionally mandated limitation on the federal courts' jurisdiction, as opposed to a self-imposed prudential restriction on the justiciability of disputes.  22 Thus, the Court applied the mootness doctrine articulated in Mills on various occasions throughout the early- to mid-20th century without explicitly suggesting that federal courts lacked the constitutional authority to adjudicate moot cases.  23 It was not until the Court's 1964 decision in Liner v. Jafco, Inc.  24 that the Court first explicitly acknowledged mootness's constitutional dimension.  25 The respondents in Liner had successfully convinced a state court to enter an injunction  26 to prohibit picketing at a construction site.  27 The petitioners thereafter appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that the state court lacked the authority to issue the injunction.  28 While the case was pending, however, "construction at the site had been completed."  29 The Court therefore had to determine whether the completion of the construction project rendered the case moot.  30

The Court answered that question in the negative.  31 The Court observed that the respondents had "filed a bond providing that, if the injunction action failed," the respondents would have to pay the petitioners "all such costs, damages, interest, and other sums as may be awarded and recovered against the [respondents] in any suit or suits which may be hereafter brought for wrongfully suing out said Injunction."  32 Because the petitioners could therefore potentially recover "damages if the injunction was wrongfully sued out,"  33 the Court determined that Liner was "not a case where th[e] Court's decision on the merits" would not "affect the rights of the litigants."  34 The Court accordingly concluded that the case was not moot because the petitioners retained "a substantial stake in the judgment" that existed "apart from and [wa]s unaffected by the completion of construction."  35

In reaching this holding, the Liner Court expressly stated that the mootness doctrine "derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy."  36 The Court's decision to characterize mootness as a constitutional doctrine had significant practical and doctrinal implications. As the Court would explain in other opinions following Liner, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a moot case even if all parties consent because moot cases do not constitute justiciable "cases or controversies" within the meaning of Article III.  37 Thus, the Constitution requires the federal courts to raise and decide issues of mootness even if the parties have not raised the issue themselves.  38 Likewise, because mootness is a constitutional limitation on the federal courts' jurisdiction, a court must also "address the question of mootness before reaching the merits" of the parties' claims.  39 Moreover, the constitutional status of the mootness doctrine entails that Congress may not statutorily authorize federal courts to adjudicate moot cases.  40

Current Doctrine

The Supreme Court has decided mootness issues in a wide array of contexts since the Supreme Court decided Liner in 1964.  41 As a result, the Court has developed a robust body of precedent governing when a case should (or should not) be dismissed as moot, as well as what procedures a federal court should follow after a case becomes moot.

General Requirements of Mootness

Under current law, "a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome."  42 "An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation."  43 Thus, "if an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit[]' at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot."  44 "A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party."  45 When (1) "it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur;" and (2) "interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation," then "the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law."  46 Significantly, however, a case does not necessarily become moot simply because intervening events make it impossible for a federal court to issue the exact form of relief that the plaintiff requests.  47 As long as the court retains the ability to "fashion some form of meaningful relief," then that "is sufficient to prevent th[e] case from being moot."  48 Similarly, even if it is uncertain that the relief granted by the court will ultimately have any meaningful practical impact on the plaintiff, that does not itself render the case moot.  49

Intervening circumstances that may render a case moot can result either from actions attributable to the litigants or from outside forces. For example, in the City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha case discussed in greater detail below, the Court ruled that an adult business's challenge to a municipality's decision to deny the business's license became moot after the business chose to cease operations while the case was pending on appeal.  50 A lawsuit predicated upon a federal statute may also become moot if Congress amends the statute while the suit remains pending.  51 A case may also become moot merely through the passage of time; for instance, the Court ruled in Camreta v. Greene that a child's constitutional challenge to an elementary school's methods of interviewing its students became moot after "the child [grew] up and moved across the country" and thus would "never again be subject to the . . . in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality [wa]s at issue."  52

The Court's 1974 opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard illustrates how the aforementioned legal principles apply in practice.  53 The petitioner in DeFunis applied for admission at a public law school.  54 After the school rejected his application, the petitioner filed suit, "contending that the procedures and criteria employed by the Law School Admissions Committee invidiously discriminated against him on account of his race."  55 The trial court agreed and ordered the law school to admit the petitioner.  56 The petitioner accordingly started taking classes at the law school while the case was on appeal.  57 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the petitioner had almost completed his law degree,  58 such that the petitioner stood to "receive his diploma regardless of any decision th[e] Court might reach on the merits of [h]is case."  59 Because the petitioner would "complete his law school studies at the end of the term . . . regardless of any decision th[e] Court might reach on the merits," the Court concluded that the case was moot.  60

Procedural Considerations Regarding Mootness

Because federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate moot cases, a federal court canand indeed mustdismiss a moot case even if none of the parties ask the court to do so.  61 Moreover, because mootness deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear a case, the Supreme Court has stated that litigants have "a 'continuing duty to inform the Court'" of intervening events that could potentially render a case moot.  62 "The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated."  63 As a result, a party may raise a mootness challenge at any time during the litigation, including for the first time on appeal.  64 "An appeal should therefore be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant 'any effectual relief whatever' in favor of the appellant."  65 "If a party to an appeal suggests that the controversy has, since the rendering of judgment below, become moot, that party bears the burden of coming forward with subsequent events that have produced that alleged result."  66

The Supreme Court has frequently considered how best to dispose of a case that has become moot during the pendency of an appeal.  67 When reviewing a lower court's judgment, an appellate court has several potential options for resolving the case: it may affirmthat is, approvethe judgment;  68 it may reversethat is, overturnthe judgment;  69 it may vacate the judgmentthat is, nullify the judgment  70 and thereby "strip[] the decision below of its binding effect;"  71 or it may remand the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.  72 As the Court explained in its 1950 opinion in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., "the established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot" on appeal or before the Court has issued its "decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss."  73 Disposing of a moot case in this manner thereby "clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance."  74 Put another way, the Munsingwear procedure for disposing of cases that become moot on appeal "prevent[s] a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences," and thereby ensures that the federal appellate courts, rather than individual litigants, have the last word on the answers to legal questions.  75

The Supreme Court has noted, however, "the decision whether to vacate" a moot case pursuant to Munsingwear "turns on 'the conditions and circumstances of the particular case.'"  76 To that end, the Supreme Court has crafted several exceptions to the Munsingwear rule.  77 For one, the Supreme Court has specified that "vacatur is in order" under Munsingwear only when mootness occurs through "happenstance"that is, "circumstances not attributable to the parties"or "the 'unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.'"  78 Thus, if a case becomes moot as a result of the parties' mutual agreement to settle the case, the Court has held that federal courts should generally not vacate the judgment.  79 The Court has justified this exception by explaining that "where mootness results from settlement . . . the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the . . . remedy of vacatur."  80 Such cases are therefore "not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed" as a result of the losing party's "own choice."  81 Likewise, the Court has ruled that it is inappropriate to "clear[] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties"  82 when the plaintiff renders the case moot by voluntarily agreeing to permanently withdraw its claims against the defendant.  83 In such instances, rather than wiping the slate clean in the manner contemplated by Munsingwear, the Court has ordered that the case be dismissed with prejudice to refiling so that "it cannot be resumed in this or any subsequent action."  84 Dismissing the case with prejudice thereby "prevent[s] the regeneration of the controversy" if the plaintiff later changes its mind and attempts to relitigate the dismissed claims in federal court.  85

Nor does the Court follow its usual practice of vacating the judgment with directions to dismiss when a case has become moot due to an intervening change in the governing law.  86 Instead, the Court ordinarily "remand[s] for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully" to respond to the intervening change in law.  87 For instance, in Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., the plaintiff challenged a Florida statute as unconstitutional.  88 While the litigation was pending, however, the Florida legislature repealed the challenged statute and enacted a new statute in its place.  89 "Rather than remanding the case to the District Court for dismissal" in the manner contemplated by Munsingwear, the Supreme Court "remand[ed] the case to the District Court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings."  90 Resolving the case in this way thereby afforded the appellants an opportunity "to demonstrate that the repealed statute retain[ed] some continuing force or to attack the newly enacted legislation."  91

Finally, "the Court's treatment of cases of cases that become moot on review from the lower federal courts" differs from its treatment of moot cases arising from state courts.  92 The Court's "regular practice in the latter situation has been to dismiss the case and leave the judgment of the state court undisturbed," rather than to vacate the judgment in the manner contemplated by Munsingwear.  93 According to the Court, allowing state court judgments in moot cases to stand "evinces a proper recognition that in the absence of any live case or controversy, [the Court] lack[s] jurisdiction and thus also the power to disturb the state court's judgment."  94

Exceptions to Mootness

Significantly, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the general mootness principles discussed above. These exceptions are known as the "voluntary cessation" doctrine  95 and the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.  96 The Court has also developed special mootness principles that govern criminal cases  97 and class action cases.  98

Voluntary Cessation Doctrine

First, the Supreme Court has frequently held that a party's voluntary cessation of an unlawful practice will usually not moot its opponent's challenge to that practice.  99 Thus, "a defendant cannot automatically moot a case by simply ending its unlawful conduct once sued."  100 This exception to the mootness doctrine exists because if a litigant could defeat a lawsuit simply by temporarily ceasing its unlawful activities, there would be nothing to stop that litigant from engaging in that unlawful behavior again after the court dismissed the case  101the litigant would effectively "be free to return to [its] old ways."  102

To illustrate, in the 1982 case of City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., the plaintiff challenged a municipal ordinance as unconstitutional.  103 While the case was pending, however, the city repealed the offending provisions of the ordinance.  104 The Court, explaining that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice," concluded that the city's revision of the ordinance did not render the plaintiff's challenge moot.  105 Because "the city's repeal of the objectionable language" in the ordinance "would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision" if the case were dismissed on mootness grounds, the Court concluded that it needed to "confront the merits of the" plaintiff's constitutional challenge.  106

The DeFunis case discussed above, by contrast, exemplifies when the voluntary cessation doctrine will not save a case from dismissal.  107 To reiterate, the petitioner in DeFunis claimed that certain law school admissions practices and criteria discriminated against him on the basis of race.  108 While the case was pending, however, the petitioner began taking classes at the law school, and had almost completed his law degree by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.  109 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the voluntary cessation doctrine rendered the case justiciable because the case's mootness had "partially stem[med] from a policy decision on the part of the respondent Law School authorities" to allow the petitioner to complete his law school studies and receive his diploma.  110 The Court emphasized that the respondents had not voluntarily ceased the allegedly discriminatory admissions practices that the petitioner challenged as unconstitutional; instead, the case became moot because the petitioner was just a few credits shy of completing his degree.  111 In other words, the case was moot not because the school stopped engaging in allegedly unlawful activity, but rather because the petitioner would "receive his diploma regardless of any decision th[e] Court might reach on the merits of th[e] case."  112

The Court has recognized several other limitations to the voluntary cessation doctrine. For one, if it is "absolutely clear" that the allegedly wrongful behavior will not recur after the court dismisses the case, then a case can become moot notwithstanding a party's voluntary cessation of that unlawful behavior.  113 "The 'heavy burden of persuading' the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness."  114 To illustrate, in Preiser v. Newkirk, a prisoner claimed that prison officials had unlawfully transferred from a medium security institution to a more restrictive maximum security institution, and asked the court to order his return to the medium security prison.  115 While the case was pending, however, officials transferred the prisoner back to the medium security institution, and then subsequently transferred him to an even less restrictive minimum security institution.  116 According to the Court, these subsequent developments made it "clear that correction authorities harbor[ed] no animosity toward" the plaintiff, such that there was "no reasonable expectation that the wrong" challenged by the prisoner would "be repeated.'"  117 The Court therefore deemed the case nonjusticiable even though the prison officials themselves had rendered the case moot by transferring the prisoner to a less restrictive institution.  118

Additionally, the voluntary cessation doctrine typically applies only when a party to the case voluntarily discontinues an allegedly unlawful action. If, instead, a case becomes moot because "of the voluntary acts of a third party non-defendant," the voluntary cessation doctrine will usually not save that case from dismissal.  119 For instance, in Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) promulgated a regulation barring recipients of federal funding from "providing significant assistance to any . . . organization which discriminates on the basis of sex."  120 The petitioner, an all-male honorary organization at a public university, commenced a lawsuit seeking to prevent the Secretary from interpreting that regulation in a manner that would require the university to ban the organization from conducting activities on campus so long as it continued to exclude women.  121 While the lawsuit was pending, however, the university determined that no matter whether the Secretary's regulation required the university to ban the organization, the university's own non-discrimination code independently barred the organization from operating on campus until it discontinued its male-only membership policy.  122 Because no judicial ruling with respect to the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation would have any effect on the university's independent decision to ban the organization pursuant to its own non-discrimination policy, the Court concluded that "the dispute as to how the [r]egulation should be interpreted" was "classically 'moot.'"  123 The Court concluded that the voluntary cessation doctrine did not save the case from dismissal, as it was "the voluntary acts of a third party non-defendant"namely, the universitythat rendered the case moot, rather than the voluntary acts of the Secretary herself.  124

Similarly, the voluntary cessation doctrine will not save a case from dismissal when it is the losing party, rather than the prevailing party, whose voluntary actions render the case moot during the pendency of an appeal.  125 Thus, in City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, a retailer of sexually explicit materials challenged a municipality's decision to deny its adult business license.  126 After the lower courts ruled against the retailer, the retailer asked the Supreme Court to review the judgment in the municipality's favor.  127 While the appeal was pending, however, the retailer opted to close its business.  128 The Court determined that the retailer's decision to cease operations had rendered the case moot because the retailer no longer had any cognizable interest in the outcome of the case.  129 Even though the circumstance rendering the case moot was the retailer's voluntary decision to close its business, the Court nonetheless concluded that the voluntary cessation doctrine did not render the case justiciable.  130 The Court emphasized that because the lower courts had ruled against the retailer, the retailer "left the fray as a loser, not a winner."  131 The Court therefore reasoned that the retailer's voluntary cessation of its business therefore did "not keep [its opponent] under the weight of an adverse judgment" or "reward an arguable manipulation of [the Court's] jurisdiction."  132

Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review

The Supreme Court has also repeatedly declined to deem cases moot that present issues or disputes that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."  133 This exception to the mootness doctrine applies "only in exceptional situations"  134 in which (1) "the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration;" and (2) "there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again."  135 According to the Court, if this exception to mootness did not exist, then certain types of time-sensitive controversies would become effectively unreviewable by the courts.  136

Perhaps the paradigmatic example of a dispute that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" is a pregnant woman's constitutional challenge to an abortion regulation.  137 Once a woman gives birth, abortion is no longer an option for terminating that particular pregnancy. However, litigation of national political significance can rarely be fully resolved in a mere nine months; "the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that [a] pregnancy will come to term before" the parties and the court could realistically litigate a constitutional challenge to an abortion statute to its conclusion.  138 Thus, if a challenge to an abortion regulation became moot as soon as the challenger gave birth, "pregnancy litigation seldom w[ould] survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review w[ould] be effectively denied."  139 Because the Supreme Court has decided that "our law should not be that rigid," the Court ruled in its 1973 opinion in Roe v. Wade that "pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness."  140 The Roe Court reasoned that, because "pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and . . . if man is to survive, it will always be with us," challenges to the constitutionality of abortion statutes usually will not become moot at the conclusion of an individual challenger's pregnancy.  141

The Court has deemed certain controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review" outside the abortion context as well.  142 For example, in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., an advocacy organization claimed that restrictions on "electioneering communications" established by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 unconstitutionally prohibited the organization from broadcasting certain political advertisements shortly before the 2004 election.  143 Even though the case did not reach the Supreme Court until long after the 2004 election had passed, the Court nonetheless concluded that the case was not moot.  144 The Court reasoned that the organization "credibly claimed that it planned on running 'materially similar' future targeted broadcast ads" in advance of future elections,  145 and the period between elections was too short to allow the organization sufficient time to fully litigate its constitutional challenges sufficiently in advance of the election date.  146

By contrast, the Court determined that the constitutional challenge in the DeFunis case mentioned above was not "capable of repetition, yet evading review."  147 To reiterate, the petitioner in DeFunis claimed that certain law school admissions practices and criteria unconstitutionally discriminated against him on the basis of race.  148 While the case was pending, however, the petitioner began taking classes at the law school, and was just about to receive his diploma.  149 Unlike the challenger to the abortion statute in Roe, who could very well have become pregnant again in the future,  150 the petitioner in DeFunis would "never again be required to run the gantlet of the Law School's admissions process" once he received his juris doctorate.  151 The DeFunis Court therefore concluded that the petitioner's constitutional challenges were "not 'capable of repetition' so far as [the petitioner was] concerned."  152 The Court further opined that challenges raised by other disappointed applicants would not evade future review either, as the Court had "no reason to suppose that a subsequent case attacking [the law school's admission] procedures w[ould] not come with relative speed to th[e] Court."  153

Criminal Cases

The Supreme Court has also articulated special mootness principles that apply in criminal cases.  154 Because criminal sentences are generally limited in duration, courts will sometimes be unable to rule on the merits of a criminal defendant's appeal before that defendant's sentence expires.  155 Thus, the Court has ruled that a criminal defendant who "wish[es] to continue his appeals after the expiration of his sentence must suffer some 'continuing injury' or 'collateral consequence' sufficient to satisfy Article III."  156 Put another way, if the defendant can point to some "disabilities or burdens which . . . flow from" his conviction even after his release from prison, then he retains "a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him" and therefore presents a justiciable controversy.  157 If, by contrast, the defendant cannot make such a showing, then the expiration of the defendant's criminal sentence will render the defendant's appeal moot.  158 Thus, in Carafas v. LaVallee, the petitioner faced lingering legal "disabilities or burdens" as a result of his conviction even though he had already "been unconditionally released from custody."  159 Specifically, the laws of the state in which the petitioner resided prohibited convicted felons from "engag[ing] in certain businesses," "serv[ing] as an official of a labor union," "vot[ing] in any election held in" his state of residence, and "serv[ing] as a juror."  160 The petitioner therefore retained "a substantial stake" in challenging the validity of his conviction so that he could engage in activities that his criminal record would otherwise prohibit.  161 The Supreme Court thus determined that, "on account of these 'collateral consequences'" of his conviction, the petitioner's case was "not moot."  162 "When the defendant challenges his underlying conviction," the Supreme Court generally "presume[s] the existence of collateral consequences" sufficient to save the defendant's appeal from dismissal on mootness grounds.  163 The Court has justified this presumption on the ground that "most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences."  164 The Court has generally declined to presume, however, that collateral consequences will result from other types of criminal sanctions, such as a revocation of parole.  165

Class Action Litigation

The Supreme Court has also developed special mootness rules that apply in class action cases.  166 In a class action, the plaintiff  167 (known as the "class representative" or the "named plaintiff") represents not only his own interests, but also the interests of other injured persons (the "class members") who are similarly situated to the class representative but are not named as formal parties to the suit.  168 Intervening events may sometimes render the controversy moot as to the named plaintiff but not as to the class members.  169 For example, in the 1979 case of Bell v. Wolfish, several pretrial detainees initiated a class action lawsuit challenging the conditions of confinement at a custodial facility not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of other detainees as well.  170 However, the named plaintiffs were transferred or released from the facility while the case is pending, and therefore were no longer being subjected to the allegedly unlawful conditions of confinement by the time the Supreme Court took up the case.  171 Although the named plaintiffs no longer had any personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, the class members who remain confined in that facility still potentially had live claims against the defendant.  172 To address cases of this sort, the Court has ruled that a justiciable controversy may potentially exist "between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot."  173 Put another way, "the termination of a class representative's claim does not" necessarily "moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class."  174 The Court, applying that principle, has occasionally resisted efforts by defendants to moot a class action case by offering to pay the class representative's entire individual claim over the class representative's objection.  175 According to the Court, allowing a class action case to become moot "simply because the defendant has sought to 'buy off' the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs" would "frustrate the objectives of class actions" because it would "requir[e] multiple plaintiffs to bring separate actions, which effectively could be 'picked off' by a defendant's tender of judgment."  176 The Court has explicitly declined to decide, however, whether other methods of mooting a class action could be permissible, such as by "deposit[ing] the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an amount payable to the plaintiff" and then successfully convincing the court to "enter[] judgment for the plaintiff in that amount."  177

Footnotes

  1.  See U.S. Const. art. III § 2 (stating that the judicial Power of the federal courts shall only extend to certain categories of Cases and Controversies).
  2.  E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) ("The Constitution's case-or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority . . . underpins . . . our mootness jurisprudence."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) ("Insofar as the concept of mootness defines constitutionally minimal conditions for the invocation of federal judicial power, its meaning and scope, as with all concepts of justiciability, must be derived from the fundamental policies informing the 'cases or controversies' limitation imposed by Art. III."); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) ("The inability of the federal judiciary 'to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.'") (quoting Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 374 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964)); SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972) (same); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (same).
  3.  Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Accord, e.g., Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).
  4.  L.A. Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498 (1969)). Accord, e.g., Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)) (same); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (same).
  5.  Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, No. 14-916, slip op. at 6 (2015) (quoting Already, 568 U.S. at 90-91). Accord, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 609 (2013) ("It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.") (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011)); Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) ("To sustain our jurisdiction . . . it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals."); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988) ("That the dispute between parties was very much alive when suit was filed . . . cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires."); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) ("Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing.").
  6.  Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14-857, slip op. at 6 (2016) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)).
  7.  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-312, slip op. at 4 (2018) (quoting Already, 568 U.S. at 91). See also, e.g., Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) ("Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies."); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978) ("Mootness . . . implicates our jurisdiction."); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974) ("Purely practical considerations have never been thought to be controlling by themselves on the issue of mootness in this Court . . . We are limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties."); Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 ("Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the Court 'is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions.'") (quoting United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)).
  8.  See, e.g., Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 933–34 (deeming case moot even though "no party had raised any issue of mootness in the [court below], and the Court of Appeals did not address the issue sua sponte"); St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 537 ("At the threshold, we confront a question of mootness. Although not raised by the parties, this issue implicates our jurisdiction."); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1978) ("There is, at the outset, a question of mootness. Although the parties have not addressed this question in their briefs, 'they may not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual case or controversy.'") (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975)); Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 ("Although neither party has urged that this case is moot, resolution of the question is essential if federal courts are to function within their constitutional sphere of authority.").
  9.  See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975) ("The standing question . . . bears close affinity to questions of . . . mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial intervention persists.").
  10.  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) ("The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III's 'case' or 'controversy' language, no less than standing does."); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) ("The Constitution's case-or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority . . . underpins both our standing and our mootness jurisprudence."). See generally CONAN III.2.13 (discussing the Article III standing doctrine).
  11.  See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (explaining that, if a case becomes moot, then "any opinion as to the legality of the challenged action would be advisory") (emphasis added). See generally CONAN III.2.10 (discussing the bar on advisory opinions). The Court has emphasized, however, that mootness is conceptually distinct from the other Article III justiciability doctrines. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190–91 (emphasizing "the distinction between mootness and standing" and explaining that mootness is more than "simply 'standing set in a time frame'") (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 364 n.* (1987) ("We reject respondents' argument that the questions of mootness and standing are necessarily intertwined."). Whereas "standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake[,] . . . by the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated, often . . . for years." Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 191. Moreover, as explained in greater detail below, the mootness doctrine is subject to exceptions that do not exist in the standing context. See, e.g., id. at 190-91 ("If mootness were simply 'standing set in a time frame,' the exception to mootness that arises when the defendant's allegedly unlawful activity is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' could not exist . . . Standing admits of no similar exception; if a plaintiff lacks standing at the time the action commences, the fact that the dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review will not entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.").
  12.  159 U.S. 651 (1895).
  13.  See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (describing Mills as "the case originally enunciating the mootness doctrine").
  14.  159 U.S. at 652.
  15.  Id. at 651-52.
  16.  Id. at 657.
  17.  Id. at 653.
  18.  Id.
  19.  Id. at 657.
  20.  Id. at 658 ("It is obvious, therefore, that, even if the bill could properly be held to present a case within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, no relief within the scope of the bill could now be granted.").
  21.  Mills does not hold, however, that an election dispute invariably becomes moot after the election occurs. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992) ("We start with Reed's contention that we should treat the controversy as moot because the election is over. We should not."); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988) ("Although the November 1984 election in which appellees had first hoped to present their proposal to the citizens of Colorado is long past, we note that this action is not moot."); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974) ("The 1972 election is long over, and no effective relief can be provided to the candidates or voters, but this case is not moot."); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973) ("Although the June primary election has been completed and the petitioners will be able to vote in the next scheduled New York primary, this case is not moot."). As explained in greater detail below, see CONAN III.2.15.3.3.2 (discussing the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine), if a case involving an election dispute implicates legal issues that may recur in the future, that case does not necessarily become moot once the challenged election ends. See Norman, 502 U.S. at 288 ("Even if the issue before us were limited to petitioners' eligibility to use the Party name on the 1990 ballot, that issue would be worthy of resolution as 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'") (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 417 n.2 ("It is reasonable to expect that the same controversy will recur between these two parties, yet evade meaningful judicial review."); Storer, 415 U.S. at 737 n.8 ("The issues properly presented, and their effects on independent candidacies, will persist as the California statutes are applied in future elections. This is, therefore, a case where the controversy is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"); Rosario, 410 U.S. at 756 n.5 ("Although the June primary election has been completed and the petitioners will be able to vote in the next scheduled New York primary, this case is not moot, since the question the petitioners raise is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'").
  22.  See 159 U.S. at 651-58.
  23.  See, e.g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 635 (1953) (analyzing mootness without mentioning Article III's case-or-controversy requirement).
  24.  375 U.S. 301 (1964).
  25.  See, e.g., Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing Liner as "the first occasion in which the Supreme Court expressly derived its lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases from Article III"); N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 n.11 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that "the Supreme Court first explicitly relied on Article III" as the basis for the mootness doctrine in Liner, thereby "elevat[ing] . . . mootness doctrine to constitutional status").
  26.  An injunction is "a court order commanding or preventing an action." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
  27.  375 U.S. at 302.
  28.  Id. at 303-04.
  29.  Id. at 303.
  30.  Id. at 304.
  31.  See id. at 304-09.
  32.  Id. at 302-03.
  33.  Id. at 305.
  34.  Id. at 306.
  35.  Id. at 305.
  36.  Id. at 306 n.3.
  37.  See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 (1975) ("While the parties may be permitted to waive nonjurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual 'case or controversy.'").
  38.  See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 933-34 (2011) (deeming case moot even though "no party had raised any issue of mootness in the [court below], and the Court of Appeals did not address the issue sua sponte"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978) ("At the threshold, we confront a question of mootness. Although not raised by the parties, this issue implicates our jurisdiction."); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978) ("There is, at the outset, a question of mootness. Although the parties have not addressed this question in their briefs, 'they may not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual case or controversy.'") (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 398 (1975)); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) ("Although neither party has urged that this case is moot, resolution of the question is essential if federal courts are to function within their constitutional sphere of authority.").
  39.  E.g., Sosna, 419 U.S. at 397.
  40.  See, e.g., Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1342 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Congress . . . may not bypass the Constitution's 'Case or Controversy' requirement."); Wilcox Elec., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 119 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Congress may not, of course, change or undermine Article III.").
  41.  See, e.g., North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (2018) (electoral redistricting case); Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2017) (habeas corpus case); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 n.3 (2013) (antitrust case); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 568 U.S. 115, 120 (2013) (admiralty case); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 446 (2009) (antitrust case); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (immigration case); Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736-37 (2005) (defamation case); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 218-19 (1990) (civil rights case); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 237 n.7 (1988) (banking law case); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987) (environmental law case); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 426 n.3 (1987) (immigration case); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 n.* (1986) (free speech case); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.2 (1986) (habeas corpus case); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 n.3 (1986) (labor law case); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1985) (bankruptcy case); United States Dep't of Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14, 14-16 (1984) (privacy law case); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 568-72 (1984) (employment law case); Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 535 n.11 (1984) (labor law case); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1984) (discrimination case); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984) (immigration case); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 96, 101 (1983) (civil rights case); Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 457 U.S. 52, 52-54 (1982) (discrimination case); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1982) (housing law case); Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 391-98 (1981) (discrimination case); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1980) (prison law case); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 733 n.7 (1978) (public assistance law case); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 11 (1975) (family law case); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974) (zoning law case); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 205-07 (1972) (habeas corpus case); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 584, 589 (1972) (election law case); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1972) (election law case); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 140-41 (1971) (legislative apportionment case).
  42.  L.A. Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498 (1969)). Accord, e.g., Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)) (same); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (same).
  43.  Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, No. 14-916, slip op. at 6 (2015) (quoting Already, 568 U.S. at 90-91). Accord, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 609 (2013) ("It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.") (quoting Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 936; Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990) ("To sustain our jurisdiction . . . it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals."); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988) ("That the dispute between parties was very much alive when suit was filed . . . cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires."); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) ("Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing.").
  44.  Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14-857, slip op. at 6 (2016) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)). See also Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) ("Mootness can arise at any stage of litigation.").
  45.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (quoting City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord, e.g., Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. ___, slip op. at 6 (same); Decker, 568 U.S. at 609 (2013) (same); Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172 (same).
  46.  L.A. Cty., 440 U.S. at 631 (internal citations, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287 (holding that a case becomes moot "when the challenged conduct ceases such that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated'") (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
  47.  See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 177 ("Such relief would of course not be fully satisfactory, but with respect to the case as a whole, even the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot.") (quoting Calderon, 518 U.S. at 150) (internal quotation marks omitted); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1992) ("While a court may not be able to return the parties to the status quo ante . . . a court can fashion some form of meaningful relief in circumstances such as these . . . The availability of this possible remedy is sufficient to prevent this case from being moot.").
  48.  Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12-13. Accord, e.g., Chafin, 568 U.S. at 177 ("Even the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot.") (quoting Calderon, 518 U.S. at 150) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  49.  See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 175 ("Enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms. Chafin chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot. Courts often adjudicate disputes where the practical impact of any decision is not assured.").
  50.  See 531 U.S. 278, 281-84 (2001).
  51.  Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 474 (1990) ("We conclude that the case has been rendered moot by 1987 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act.").
  52.  563 U.S. 692, 698 (2011).
  53.  416 U.S. 312 (1974).
  54.  Id. at 314.
  55.  Id. See also infra CONAN VII.14.10.4.4 (discussing constitutional challenges to educational admissions practices that allegedly discriminate on the basis of race).
  56.  416 U.S. at 314-15.
  57.  Id. at 315.
  58.  See id.
  59.  Id. at 317.
  60.  Id. at 319-20.
  61.  See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 933-34 (2011) (deeming case moot even though "no party had raised any issue of mootness in the [court below], and the Court of Appeals did not address the issue sua sponte"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978) ("At the threshold, we confront a question of mootness. Although not raised by the parties, this issue implicates our jurisdiction."); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978) ("There is, at the outset, a question of mootness. Although the parties have not addressed this question in their briefs, 'they may not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual case or controversy.'") (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975)); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) ("Although neither party has urged that this case is moot, resolution of the question is essential if federal courts are to function within their constitutional sphere of authority.").
  62.  Bd. of License Comm'rs of Town of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985) (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)). Accord City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288 (2000) (chastising litigant for its "failure, despite its obligation to the Court, to mention a word about the potential mootness issue in its brief in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari").
  63.  E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
  64.  E.g., DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 465 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that mootness is a "jurisdictional issue[] that may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal"); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 1999) ("A case can become moot at any time, and destroy the court's jurisdiction."); Smith v. United States (In re Smith), 921 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Mootness goes to the very heart of Article III jurisdiction, and any party can raise it at any time.").
  65.  Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Accord, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) ("If an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief whatever' to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.") (quoting Mills, 159 U.S. at 653).
  66.  Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993).
  67.  See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 314 (1999) ("Generally, an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction becomes moot when the trial court enters a permanent injunction, because the former merges into the latter. We have dismissed appeals in such circumstances.").
  68.  Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
  69.  Id.
  70.  Id.
  71.  Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200 (1988).
  72.  Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
  73.  United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). Accord, e.g., Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-654, slip op. at 5 (2018) (vacating and remanding a moot case for dismissal in the manner contemplated by Munsingwear); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-312, slip op. at 9-12 (2018) (same); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-2, slip op. at 3 (2018) (same); Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712-14 (2011) (same); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 80 (1997) (same); Frank v. Minn. Newspaper Ass'n, Inc., 490 U.S. 225, 227 (1989) (same); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (same); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 73 (1983) (same); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 92-94 & n.* (1979) (same); L.A. Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 (1979) (same); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975) (same); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1975) (same); Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of City of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (same). See also, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94-97 (2009) (analyzing the Munsingwear rule); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22 (1994) (describing Munsingwear as "the leading case on vacatur"); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 93 n.* (1979) ("United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. is perhaps the leading case on the proper disposition of cases that become moot on appeal.").
  74.  Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40.
  75.  See id. at 41.
  76.  Azar, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-654, slip op. at 3 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesselschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 478 (1916)).
  77.  See, e.g., Camreta, 563 U.S. at 712 (explaining that, although the Munsingwear rule provides the "established" practice for resolving a civil case that "becomes moot pending appeal," the Munsingwear doctrine is "not exceptionless").
  78.  Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 71-72 (quoting U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 23). See also Azar, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-654, slip op. at 3 ("One clear example where vacatur is in order is when mootness occurs through the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.") (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987) ("The controversy did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties. The controversy ended when the losing party . . . declined to pursue its appeal. Accordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inapplicable to this case.").
  79.  U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29. See also, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94-97 (2009) (analyzing the interplay between Munsingwear and U.S. Bancorp).
  80.  U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25.
  81.  Id.
  82.  See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950).
  83.  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513 (1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1988).
  84.  Deakins, 484 U.S. at 200 n.4. Accord Webster, 492 U.S. at 513 ("Because this dispute was rendered moot in part by appellees' willingness permanently to withdraw their equitable claims from their federal action, a dismissal with prejudice is indicated.") (quoting Deakins, 484 U.S. at 200) (brackets omitted).
  85.  Deakins, 484 U.S. at 200.
  86.  E.g., Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 482 (1990) ("Our ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss. However, in instances where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully.") (internal citations omitted).
  87.  Id. See also ATF v. Gatiolo, 477 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1986) (remanding case for further proceedings following amendment of statutory provision at issue); Crowell v. Mader, 444 U.S. 505, 505-06 (1980) ("Appellees may still wish to attack the newly enacted legislation . . . We direct that the judgment of the District Court be vacated without prejudice to such further proceedings in the District Court as may be appropriate.").
  88.  404 U.S. 412, 412-14 (1972).
  89.  Id. at 414.
  90.  Id. at 415.
  91.  Id.
  92.  ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 621 n.1 (1989).
  93.  Id. (citing Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 481 U.S. 1044 (1987); Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 420 U.S. 985 (1975)).
  94.  Id.
  95.  See infra CONAN III.15.3.3.1.
  96.  See infra CONAN III.15.3.3.2.
  97.  See infra CONAN III.15.3.3.3.
  98.  See infra CONAN III.15.3.3.4.
  99.  See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-312, slip op. at 4 n.* (2018); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, No. 15-577, slip op. at 5 n.1 (2016); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287-89 (2000); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000); Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 n.14 (1986); United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 456 n.6 (1983); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982); L.A. Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810 (1974).
  100.  Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013).
  101.  See id. (explaining that, in the absence of the voluntary cessation doctrine, "a defendant could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends"); Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (2012) ("A dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed."); City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1 (2001) ("A party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior."); City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289 ("In this case the city's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated."); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 309 (1897) ("If the mere dissolution of the association worked an abatement of the suit as to all the defendants . . . it is plain that they have thus discovered an effectual means to prevent the judgment of this court being given upon the question really involved in the case. The defendants having succeeded in the court below, it would only be necessary thereafter to dissolve their association and instantly form another of a similar kind, and the fact of the dissolution would prevent an appeal to this court or procure its dismissal if taken. This result does not and ought not to follow.").
  102.  Allee, 416 U.S. at 811 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963)). Accord, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (same).
  103.  455 U.S. at 284-86.
  104.  Id. at 288.
  105.  Id. at 288-89.
  106.  Id. at 289. The Court subsequently elaborated that "City of Mesquite does not stand for the proposition that it is only the possibility that the selfsame statute will be enacted that prevents a case from being moot; if that were the rule, a defendant could moot a case by repealing the challenged statute and replacing it with one that differs only in some insignificant respect." Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993). But see Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982) (deeming case moot, without explicitly mentioning the voluntary cessation doctrine, where intervening party "substantially amended its regulations" "while the case was pending on appeal").
  107.  See 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974).
  108.  Id. at 314-15.
  109.  Id. at 315-317.
  110.  Id. at 317.
  111.  See id. at 318.
  112.  Id. at 317.
  113.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, No. 15-577, slip op. at 5 n.1 (2016) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Accord, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) ("Voluntary cessation of challenged conduct moots a case, however, only if it is 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'") (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
  114.  Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). Accord, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church, 582 U.S. ___, slip op. at 5 n.1; Adarand Constructors, 528 U.S. at 222. See also Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (explaining that a party's burden to avoid the voluntary cessation doctrine is "formidable").
  115.  422 U.S. 395, 396-98 (1975).
  116.  Id. at 401.
  117.  Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
  118.  Id. ("We have before us more than a mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct, where we would leave the defendant free to return to his old ways.") (internal quotations, ellipses, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
  119.  Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72 (1983) (per curiam) (emphasis added). See also Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200 n.4 (1988) ("The Court's ability to prevent respondents from renewing their claims after they are dismissed as moot distinguishes this case from one in which a defendant attempts to avoid appellate review by voluntarily ceasing the challenged conduct without losing the ability to reinitiate the conduct once the mooted case is dismissed.") (emphasis in original).
  120.  Iron Arrow, 464 U.S. at 68 (quoting 45 C.F.R. 86.31(b)(7) (1975)).
  121.  Id. at 69.
  122.  Id. at 69-70.
  123.  Id. at 70-71.
  124.  Id. at 72.
  125.  City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 (2001).
  126.  Id. at 281-82.
  127.  Id. at 282.
  128.  Id. at 282-83.
  129.  Id. at 283-85.
  130.  Id. at 283-84.
  131.  Id. at 284.
  132.  Id.
  133.  See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, No. 14-916, slip op. at 7 (2015); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439-41 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992); Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 498 U.S. 466, 473 (1991); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-23 (1988); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 436 n.4 (1987); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1987); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1987); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Cty. of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Cty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 115 n.13 (1981); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.5 (1979); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978); United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165 n.6 (1977); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125-27 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16 (1911). But see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-312, slip op. at 9-12 (2018) (rejecting litigants' argument that defendants' allegedly unlawful practice was capable of repetition yet evading review); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93-94 (2009) (same); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1998) (same); Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1990) (same); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982) (same); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979) (same); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 133 (1977) (same); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975) (same); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975) (same); Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 414 (1972) (same).
  134.  Kingdomware Techs., 579 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17).
  135.  United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011) (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17). Accord, e.g., Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, slip op. at 9 (same); Kingdomware Techs., 579 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7 (same); Turner, 564 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149) (same); Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462 (same); Lewis, 494 U.S. at 482 (same); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 417 n.2 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)) (same); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 434 n.5 (1980) (same); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 377 (same); Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 187 (same); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 109 (1978) (same); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 774 (same). The Court has explained, however, that the "capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine "will not revive a dispute which became moot before the action commenced." Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991).
  136.  See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 400 (1975) ("The case before us is one in which state officials will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged statute and yet, because of the passage of time, no single challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.").
  137.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). See generally CONAN VII.5.20.4.2.2 (analyzing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding abortion). But see Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-654, slip op. at 3 (2018) (dismissing abortion case as moot without applying, analyzing, or mentioning the "capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine).
  138.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
  139.  See id.
  140.  Id.
  141.  Id. (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 515). Accord Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) ("A woman who is no longer pregnant may nonetheless retain the right to litigate the point because it is 'capable of repetition yet evading review.'") (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25).
  142.  See supra note 133.
  143.  FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457-60 (2007).
  144.  Id. at 462-64.
  145.  Id. at 463.
  146.  See id. at 462-63. See also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008) (rejecting mootness challenge in case whose facts "closely resemble[d]" those at issue in Wisconsin Right to Life).
  147.  416 U.S. at 318-19.
  148.  Id. at 314-15.
  149.  Id. at 315-317.
  150.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
  151.  416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974).
  152.  Id.
  153.  Id.
  154.  See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439 (2011); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 3-16 (1998); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 n.2 (1993); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 630-34 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1977); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50-58 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236-38 (1968).
  155.  See, e.g., Sibron, 392 U.S. at 50, 52 ("It is asserted that because Sibron has completed service of the six-month sentence imposed upon him as a result of his conviction, the case has become moot . . . We have concluded that the case is not moot . . . There was no way for Sibron to bring his case here before his six-month sentence expired.").
  156.  Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 936. Accord, e.g., Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 371 n.2 ("We have often observed . . . that 'the possibility of a criminal defendant's suffering "collateral legal consequences" from a sentence already served' precludes a finding of mootness.") (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108 n.3).
  157.  Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)).
  158.  E.g., Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 936.
  159.  Carafas, 391 U.S. at 236-37.
  160.  Id. at 237 (1968).
  161.  Id. (quoting Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 222).
  162.  Id. at 237-38 (1968) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633-34 & n.2 (1968)).
  163.  Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 936. See also, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985) (deeming case "not moot" where "some collateral consequences of [the party's] conviction remain[ed]").
  164.  Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968).
  165.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998) ("declin[ing] to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III's injury-in-fact requirement" would result from a "petitioner's parole revocation"). See also, e.g., Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 936-37 ("When a defendant challenges only an expired sentence, no such presumption [of non-mootness] applies, and the defendant must bear the burden of identifying some ongoing 'collateral consequence' that is 'traceable' to the challenged portion of the sentence and is 'likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'") (emphasis in original) (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7).
  166.  See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14-857, slip op. at 1-15 (2016); Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1991); U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-409 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339-40 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.5 (1979); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 127-36 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976); Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of City of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 128-30 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975). The Court has emphasized, however, that the legal principles pertaining to mootness and class actions have little to no application outside the class action context. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-312, slip op. at 4-9 (2018) (explaining that the holdings in the cases listed above are "tied . . . to the class action setting from which [they] emerged"); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 73-74 (2013) (holding that, because class "actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the" Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), "the mere presence of collective-action allegations in [an FLSA] complaint cannot save the suit from mootness once the individual claim is satisfied").
  167.  While it is also possible to bring a class action in federal court against a class of defendants, class actions on behalf of classes of plaintiffs are more common. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued . . . .").
  168.  See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1982) ("The class-action device was designed as 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only' . . . We have repeatedly held that 'a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.'") (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
  169.  See, e.g., Sosna, 419 U.S. at 401 ("Although the controversy is no longer alive as to appellant Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to represent.").
  170.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 523.
  171.  See id. at 526 n.5.
  172.  See id.
  173.  Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402.
  174.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 526 n.5 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975)). Accord, e.g., Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (same); U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (holding that an "appeal of the denial of [a] class certification motion" "does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive claim"). But see Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. ___, No. 17-654, slip op. at 1, 3 (2018) (dismissing a putative class action as moot without applying, analyzing, or mentioning this principle); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132 (1977) (holding that a class action may be unable to proceed where an intervening event moots "not only the claims of the named plaintiffs but also the claims of a large number of unnamed plaintiffs").
  175.  See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14-857, slip op. at 1 (2016) (holding that "an unaccepted offer to satisfy the named plaintiff's individual claim" does not "render a case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated"); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("To deny the right to appeal simply because the defendant has sought to 'buy off' the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound judicial administration.").
  176.  Roper, 445 U.S. at 339.
  177.  Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14-857, slip op. at 11-12 ("That question is appropriately reserved for a case in which it is not hypothetical.").