Article I, Section 7, Clause 1:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
The purpose of clause 3, the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause (ORV Clause), is not readily apparent. For years it was assumed that the Framers inserted the clause to prevent Congress from evading the veto clause by designating as something other than a bill measures intended to take effect as laws. 1 Why a separate clause was needed for this purpose has not been explained. Recent scholarship presents a different possible explanation for the ORV Clause – that it was designed to authorize delegation of lawmaking power to a single House, subject to presentment, veto, and possible two-House veto override. 2 If construed literally, the clause could have bogged down the intermediate stages of the legislative process, and Congress made practical adjustments. At the request of the Senate, the Judiciary Committee in 1897 published a comprehensive report detailing how the clause had been interpreted over the years. Briefly, it was shown that the word
necessary in the clause had come to refer to the necessity for law-making; that is, any
order, resolution, or vote must be submitted if it is to have the force of law. But
votes taken in either House preliminary to the final passage of legislation need not be submitted to the other House or to the President, nor must concurrent resolutions merely expressing the views or
sense of the Congress. 3
Although the ORV Clause excepts only adjournment resolutions and makes no explicit reference to resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, the practice and understanding, beginning with the Bill of Rights, has been that resolutions proposing constitutional amendments need not be presented to the President for veto or approval. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 4 in which the Court rejected a challenge to the validity of the Eleventh Amendment based on the assertion that it had not been presented to the President, is usually cited for the proposition that presentation of constitutional amendment resolutions is not required. 5
The Legislative Veto
Beginning in the 1930s, the concurrent resolution (as well as the simple resolution) was put to a new use – serving as the instrument to terminate powers delegated to the Chief Executive or to disapprove particular exercises of power by him or his agents. The
legislative veto or
congressional veto was first developed in context of the delegation to the Executive of power to reorganize governmental agencies, 6 and was really furthered by the necessities of providing for national security and foreign affairs immediately prior to and during World War II. 7 The proliferation of
congressional veto provisions in legislation over the years raised a series of interrelated constitutional questions. 8 Congress until relatively recently had applied the veto provisions to some action taken by the President or another executive officer – such as a reorganization of an agency, the lowering or raising of tariff rates, the disposal of federal property – then began expanding the device to give itself a negative over regulations issued by executive branch agencies, and proposals were made to give Congress a negative over all regulations issued by executive branch independent agencies. 9
In INS v. Chadha, 10 the Court held a one-House congressional veto to be unconstitutional as violating both the bicameralism principles reflected in Art. I, §§ 1 and 7, and the presentment provisions of § 7, cl. 2 and 3. The provision in question was § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized either house of Congress by resolution to veto the decision of the Attorney General to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the country. The Court's analysis of the presentment issue made clear, however, that two-House veto provisions, despite their compliance with bicameralism, and committee veto provisions suffer the same constitutional infirmity. 11 In the words of dissenting Justice White, the Court in Chadha
sound[ed] the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' 12
In determining that veto of the Attorney General's decision on suspension of deportation was a legislative action requiring presentment to the President for approval or veto, the Court set forth the general standard.
Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and in fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.' [T]he action taken here . . . was essentially legislative, the Court concluded, because
it had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch. 13
The other major component of the Court's reasoning in Chadha stemmed from its reading of the Constitution as making only
explicit and unambiguous exceptions to the bicameralism and presentment requirements. Thus the House alone was given power of impeachment, and the Senate alone was given power to convict upon impeachment, to advise and consent to executive appointments, and to advise and consent to treaties; similarly, the Congress may propose a constitutional amendment without the President's approval, and each House is given autonomy over certain
internal matters, e.g., judging the qualifications of its members. By implication then, exercises of legislative power not falling within any of these
narrow, explicit, and separately justified exceptions must conform to the prescribed procedures:
passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. 14
The breadth of the Court's ruling in Chadha was evidenced in its 1986 decision in Bowsher v. Synar. 15 Among that case's rationales for holding the Deficit Control Act unconstitutional was that Congress had, in effect, retained control over executive action in a manner resembling a congressional veto.
[A]s Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly – by passing new legislation. 16 Congress had offended this principle by retaining removal authority over the Comptroller General, charged with executing important aspects of the Budget Act.
That Chadha does not spell the end of some forms of the legislative veto is evident from events since 1983, which have seen the enactment of various devices, such as
report and wait provisions and requirements for various consultative steps before action may be undertaken. But the decision has stymied the efforts in Congress to confine the discretion it confers through delegation by giving it a method of reviewing and if necessary voiding actions and rules promulgated after delegations.
The Line Item Veto
For more than a century, United States Presidents had sought the authority to strike out of appropriations bills particular items – to veto
line items of money bills and sometimes legislative measures as well. Finally, in 1996, Congress approved and the President signed the Line Item Veto Act. 17 The law empowered the President, within five days of signing a bill, to
cancel in whole spending items and targeted, defined tax benefits. In acting on this authority, the President was to determine that the cancellation of each item would
(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest. 18 In Clinton v. City of New York, 19 the Court held the Act unconstitutional because it did not comply with the Presentment Clause.
Although Congress in passing the Act considered itself to have been delegating power, 20 and although the dissenting Justices would have upheld the Act as a valid delegation, 21 the Court instead analyzed the statute under the Presentment Clause. In the Court's view, the two bills from which the President subsequently struck items became law the moment the President signed them. His cancellations thus amended and in part repealed the two federal laws. Under its most immediate precedent, the Court continued, statutory repeals must conform to the Presentment Clause's
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure for enacting or repealing a law. 22 In no respect did the procedures in the Act comply with that clause, and in no way could they. The President was acting in a legislative capacity, altering a law in the manner prescribed, and legislation must, in the way Congress acted, be bicameral and be presented to the President after Congress acted. Nothing in the Constitution authorized the President to amend or repeal a statute unilaterally, and the Court could construe both constitutional silence and the historical practice over 200 years as
an express prohibition of the President's action. 23