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  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.3 The Power of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice
    The Power of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. While legal doctrine . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction 3 (1999); II Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 762 (1833) (The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a political character.).
    • impeachment (55)
  • ArtII.S4.2.2 Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background
    Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The concept of impeachment and the standard of high crimes and misdemeanors originally stems from English Parliamentary . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the impeachment clauses, ArtIII.S1.2.1.2Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; ArtI.S2.C5.1.2The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; ArtI.S3.C6.1.2The Power to Try Impeachments: . . .
    • impeachment (52)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.7 Impeachable Offenses: Contemporary Judicial Impeachments
    Impeachable Offenses: Contemporary Judicial Impeachments Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Report to Accompany H. Res. 461, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Rep. No. 99-688, at 1–2 (1986).
    • impeachment (46)
  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.2 The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background
    The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The concept of . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the Constitution's impeachment provisions, see ArtIII.S1.2.1.2Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; ArtI.S3.C6.1.2The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; ArtII.S4.2.2Impeachable Offenses: . . .
    • impeachment (40)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.1 Impeachable Offenses: Early Historical Practice (1789–1860)
    Impeachable Offenses: Early Historical Practice (1789–1860) Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Congressional understanding of the scope of activities subject to impeachment and the potential persons who . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Buckner F. Melton, The First Impeachment 60–103 (1998); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 48 (2000); David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The . . .
    • impeachment (37)
  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.1 The Power of Impeachment: Overview
    The Power of Impeachment: Overview Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Constitution confers upon . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate . . .
    • impeachment (31)
  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.3 Presidential Impeachments
    Presidential Impeachments Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For a more thorough examination of the Johnson impeachment, see discussion infra ArtII.S4.2.3.2Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Andrew Johnson.
    • impeachment (31)
  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.1 The Power to Try Impeachments: Overview
    The Power to Try Impeachments: Overview Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate . . .
    • impeachment (30)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.6 Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Bill Clinton
    Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Bill Clinton Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • H.R. Rep. No. 105-830, at 28 (1998); The Starr Report: Grounds For Impeachment, No. II, Wash. Post (1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/icreport/7groundsii.htm.
    • impeachment (28)
  • ArtII.S4.1.2.1 Offices Eligible for Impeachment
    Offices Eligible for Impeachment Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Statements from at least one delegate indicate that participants at the Constitutional Convention assumed that judges were subject to impeachment. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (describing Rufus King's observation that judges would be impeachable because they hold their office . . .
    • impeachment (25)
  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.2 The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background
    The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the Constitution's impeachment provisions, see ArtIII.S1.2.1.2Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; ArtI.S2.C5.1.2The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; ArtI.S3.C6.1.2The Power to Try . . .
    • impeachment (25)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.5 Impeachable Offenses: Effort to Impeach Richard Nixon
    Impeachable Offenses: Effort to Impeach Richard Nixon Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The impeachment investigation and ensuing resignation of President Richard Nixon stands out as a profoundly . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Jerry Zeifman, Without Honor: Crimes of Camelot and the Impeachment of President Nixon 59 (1995).
    • impeachment (21)
  • ArtII.S4.1.1 Impeachment and Removal from Office: Overview
    Impeachment and Removal from Office: Overview Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate . . .
    • impeachment (20)
  • ArtI.S3.C7.1.1 Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Overview
    Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Overview Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate . . .
    • impeachment (19)
  • ArtII.S4.1.2.2 Future of the Impeachment Remedy
    Future of the Impeachment Remedy Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Charles Black, Impeachment 33–36 (1974).
    • impeachment (19)
  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.1 Senate Practices in Impeachment
    Senate Practices in Impeachment Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
    • impeachment (19)
  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.3 Good Behavior Clause: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . the subject of longstanding debate. Some have argued that the phrase denotes an alternative standard of removal for federal judges beyond high crimes and misdemeanors that normally may give rise to the impeachment of federal officers. Others have rejected this notion, reading the good behavior phrase simply to make clear that federal judges retain their office for life unless they are removed via a proper . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 122–80 (1973) (arguing that the good behavior standard is distinct from high crimes and misdemeanors and Congress may remove judges whose misbehavior does . . .
    • impeachment (17)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.4 Impeachable Offenses: Early Twentieth Century Practices
    Impeachable Offenses: Early Twentieth Century Practices Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The twentieth century saw further development of the scope of conduct considered by Congress to be impeachable, . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, and Misfortunes: The Federal Impeachment Trials 191 (1992).
    • impeachment (17)
  • ArtI.S3.C7.1.2 Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice
    Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the background of the Constitution's impeachment provisions, see ArtIII.S1.2.1.2Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; ArtI.S3.C6.1.2The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; ArtII.S4.2.2Impeachable Offenses: . . .
    • impeachment (17)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.2 Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
    Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Andrew Johnson Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments 185–98 (1992).
    • impeachment (15)
  • ArtII.S4.2.1 Impeachable Offenses: Overview
    Impeachable Offenses: Overview Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The Constitution provides that the grounds of impeachment are for treason, bribery, or other high Crimes and . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Charles Black, Impeachment 27 (1974).
    • impeachment (13)
  • ArtII.S4.2.3.3 Impeachable Offenses: Post-Bellum Practices (1865–1900)
    Impeachable Offenses: Post-Bellum Practices (1865–1900) Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The post-bellum experience in American history saw a variety of government officials impeached on a number of . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • 3 Hinds, supra note 1, at §§ 2444–68; see H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 20 (Comm. Print 1974).
    • impeachment (13)
  • Amdt6.3.2.1.1 Right to an Impartial Jury: Current Doctrine
    . . . denied by a biased jury. With origins dating from the English common law, a rule of evidence has been adopted by the federal rules of evidence and by the vast majority of the states that forbids the impeachment or questioning of a verdict by inquiring into the internal deliberations of the jury. The no impeachment rule, which aims to promote full and vigorous discussion by jurors and to preserve the . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The no-impeachment rule does have three central exceptions, allowing a juror to testify about (1) extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (2) outside influences brought . . .
    • impeachment (12)
  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.1 Good Behavior Clause: Overview
    . . . removal of federal judges has been the subject of debate; in particular, whether the phrase elucidates a distinct standard for removal apart from the high crimes and misdemeanors standard applicable to the impeachment of other federal officers. While this question has not been definitively resolved, historical practice indicates an understanding that the Good Behavior Clause protects federal judges from . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate . . .
    • impeachment (9)
  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.2 Requirement of Oath or Affirmation
    Requirement of Oath or Affirmation Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Charles Black, Impeachment 9–10 (1974).
    • impeachment (8)
  • ArtII.S2.C3.2.4.1.1 Presidential Immunity to Criminal and Civil Suits: Civil Cases
    . . . that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court? Rare has been the opportunity for the Court to elucidate its opinion . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . the President of the United States may be required, by the process of this court, to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime. 71 U.S. at 498. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825–28 (1992) (Justice Scalia concurring). In NTEU v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that . . .
    • impeachment (8)
  • Amdt5.3.2.2.3.2.3 Exceptions to Miranda
    . . . clearly invokes them later. The admissions of an unwarned or improperly warned suspect may not be used directly against him at trial, but the Court has permitted some use for other purposes, such as impeachment. A confession or other incriminating admissions obtained in violation of Miranda may not, of course, be introduced against him at trial for purposes of establishing guilt or for determining . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . (1971). The defendant had denied only the commission of the offense. The Court observed that it was only speculative to think that impermissible police conduct would be encouraged by permitting such impeachment, a resort to deterrence analysis being contemporaneously used to ground the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, whereas the defendant’s right to testify was the obligation to testify . . .
    • impeachment (5)
  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.2 Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background
    . . . Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Just as the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors for impeachments was borrowed from English practice, so too was the term good behavior borrowed from English law concerning the duration of a judges tenure. Prior to 1701, the tenure of judges in England was . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the impeachment clauses, see ArtI.S2.C5.1.2The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; ArtI.S3.C6.1.2The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; ArtII.S4.2.2Impeachable . . .
    • impeachment (4)
  • Amdt5.4.8.2.1.2.3 Evidentiary Requirements
    . . . proceeding would have been different. This materiality standard, found in contexts outside of Brady inquiries, is applied not only to exculpatory material, but also to material that would be relevant to the impeachment of witnesses. Thus, where inconsistent earlier statements by a witness to an abduction were not disclosed, the Court weighed the specific effect that impeachment of the witness would have had . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution does not require the government, prior to entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses against the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Nor has it been settled whether inconsistent prosecutorial . . .
    • impeachment (4)
  • ArtII.S2.C3.2.3 Executive Privilege: Overview
    . . . its assertion by the principle of judicial review. Because of these cases, because of the intensified congressional-presidential dispute, and especially because of the introduction of the issue into an impeachment proceeding, a somewhat lengthy treatment of the doctrine is called for. Conceptually, the doctrine of executive privilege may well reflect different considerations in different factual situations. . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • President Nixon’s position was set out in a June 9, 1974, letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 10 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 592 (1974). The impeachment article and supporting material are set out in H. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
    • impeachment (4)
  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.4.1 Alternatives to Impeachment
    Alternatives to Impeachment Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. As an alternative to the impeachment . . .
    • impeachment (3)
  • Amdt5.3.1.2 General Protections Against Self-Incrimination: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . arrest and receipt of a Miranda warning he remained silent and did not give the police the exculpatory story he told at trial. But where the defendant took the stand and testified, the Court permitted the impeachment use of his pre-arrest silence when that silence had in no way been officially encouraged, through a Miranda warning or otherwise. Further, the Court held inadmissible at the subsequent trial . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986). In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the prosecution violated due process by using his post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes at trial, the proper standard for harmless-error review is that announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) – whether the due process error had substantial . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • Amdt6.7.2.3 When the Right to Counsel Applies
    . . . examination and cross-examination expose weaknesses in the prosecutions case and thereby save the defendant from being bound over, and could in any event preserve for use in cross-examination at trial and impeachment purposes testimony he could elicit at the hearing; he could discover as much as possible of the prosecutions case against defendant for better trial preparation; and he could influence the . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . Amendment is admissible to impeach defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony); Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (statement made to informant planted in defendant's holding cell admissible for impeachment purposes because [t]he interests safeguarded by . . . exclusion are 'outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process).
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtI.S7.C3.1 Passage of Orders, Resolutions, or Votes
    . . . reasoning in Chadha stemmed from its reading of the Constitution as making only explicit and unambiguous exceptions to the bicameralism and presentment requirements. Thus the House alone was given power of impeachment, and the Senate alone was given power to convict upon impeachment, to advise and consent to executive appointments, and to advise and consent to treaties; similarly, the Congress may propose . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.2 Commander in Chief Power: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The Limited View The purely military aspects of the Commander-in-Chiefship were those that were originally stressed. Hamilton said the office would amount to nothing more than the supreme . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.1 Scope of the Pardon Power
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The pardon power embraces all offences against the United States, except cases of impeachment, and includes the power to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures, except as to money covered . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtII.S2.C2.2.1.5.1 Removing Officers: Doctrine During 1930s
    . . . Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. The Myers Case Save for the provision which it makes for a power of impeachment of civil officers of the United States, the Constitution contains no reference to a power to remove from office, and until its decision in Myers v. United States, on October 25, 1926, the Supreme . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . reticence of the Constitution respecting removal left room for four possibilities: first, the one suggested by the common law doctrine of estate in office, from which the conclusion followed that the impeachment power was the only power of removal intended by the Constitution; second, that the power of removal was an incident of the power of appointment and hence belonged, at any rate in the . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.1.2.1.2 Inherent Powers of Federal Courts: Contempt and Sanctions
    . . . the same. The only limitation placed on this power was that summary attachment was made a negation of all other modes of punishment. The abuse of this extensive power led, following the unsuccessful impeachment of Judge James H. Peck of the Federal District Court of Missouri, to the passage of the Act of 1831 limiting the power of the federal courts to punish contempts to misbehavior in the presence . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • 18 U.S.C. § 401. For a summary of the Peck impeachment and the background of the act of 1831, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of Powers, . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.2.2 Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. One Supreme Court While the Convention specified that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would preside over any Presidential impeachment trial in the Senate, decisions on the size and composition of the Supreme Court, the time and place for sitting, its internal organization, and other matters were left to the Congress. The . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • 40. Preamble
    Pre.1.3 Preamble: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . Representative Barbara Jordan, the first African-American woman elected to the House of Representatives, quoted the Preamble in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee as it considered the Articles of Impeachment for President Richard Nixon. In that statement, she noted that through the process of amendment, interpretation, and court decision she had been included in We, the people and was now serving . . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings on H. Res. 803 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 111 (1974) (statement of Rep. Jordan).
    • impeachment (2)
  • 41. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Executive Privilege;
    Impeachment;
    Impeachment Trial;
    Justiciability;
    Legislative Powers;
    Legislative Process;
    . . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S2.C3.1 In General
    In General Article III, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt4.5.2.1 Adoption of a Federal Exclusionary Rule
    . . . willingness to uphold warrantless searches as not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, however, may reduce the frequency with which the good-faith issue arises in the context of the exclusionary rule.
    • Footnotes:
      • United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (now vitiated by Havens). The impeachment exception applies only to the defendant’s own testimony, and may not be extended to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the testimony of other defense witnesses. James v. Illinois, . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt5.2.1.1 Double Jeopardy Clause: Historical Background
    . . . rights following the Revolution continued the differing approaches. Madisons version of the guarantee as introduced in the House of Representatives read: No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense. Opposition in the House proceeded on the proposition that the language could be construed to prohibit a second trial after a successful . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt6.3.3.1 Right to a Local Jury: Historical Background
    . . . efforts to write into the Bill of Rights an express vicinage provision were rebuffed by the Senate, and the present language was adopted as a compromise. The provisions limit the Federal Government only.
    • Footnotes:
      • The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S1.C8.1 Oath of Office
    . . . idea next turned up in a message by President Lincoln justifying his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus without obtaining congressional authorization. And counsel to President Johnson during his impeachment trial adverted to the theory, but only in passing. Beyond these isolated instances, it does not appear to be seriously contended that the oath adds anything to the Presidents powers.
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.1 Commander in Chief Power: Historical Background
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Surprisingly little discussion of the Commander-in-Chief Clause is found in the Convention or in the ratifying debates. From the evidence available, it appears that the Framers vested the . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.3.1 Imposing Martial Law
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628, provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.3.2 Provision for Detention and Trial of Prisoners of War and Enemy Combatants
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs In 1942 eight youths, seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received training in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.2 Presidential Advisors
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The authority in Article II, § 2, cl. 1 to require the written opinion of the heads of executive departments is the meager residue from a persistent effort in the Federal Convention to impose . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.2 Legal Effect of a Pardon
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. In the first case to be decided concerning the pardoning power, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, said: As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.3 Congress's Ability to Limit the Pardon Power
    . . . executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Congress cannot limit the effects of a presidential amnesty. Thus the act of July 12, 1870, making proof of loyalty necessary to recover property abandoned and sold by the government during . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C2.2.1.5.2 Removing Officers: Current Doctrine
    . . . subservient to Congress. Relying expressly upon Myers, the Court concluded that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. But Humphreys Executor was also cited with approval, and to the contention that invalidation of this law would cast doubt on the status of the independent agencies the Court rejoined that . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C3.1.3.1 Recess Appointments of Article III Judges
    . . . clearly fall within the terms of the Recess Appointments Clause. But, unlike with other offices, a problem exists. Article III judges are appointed during good behavior, subject only to removal through impeachment. A judge, however, who is given a recess appointment may be removed by the Senates failure to advise and consent to his appointment; moreover, on the bench, prior to Senate confirmation, he . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S3.1.3.1 Take Care Clause: Overview
    . . . Clause required of him scarcely more than that he should bring a criminally negligent official to book for his derelictions, either by removing him or by setting in motion against him the processes of impeachment or of criminal prosecutions. The opinion entirely overlooked the important question of the location of the power to interpret the law, which is inevitably involved in any effort to enforce . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.2.1 Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts: Historical Background
    . . . federal courts. The requirement that judges hold their office during good behavior excited no controversy during the Convention, although the lack of an enforcement mechanism for this provision resulted in impeachment under Article II becoming the primary mechanism for removal of a federal judge. And finally, the only substantial dispute that arose regarding the denial to Congress of the power to reduce . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S2.C1.1.5.3.3 Standing Requirement: Standing of Federal and State Legislators
    . . . actions to be beyond his constitutional authority, the holding would have a distinct and significant bearing upon the Members duties to vote appropriations and other supportive legislation and to consider impeachment. The breadth of this rationale was disapproved in subsequent cases. The leading decision is Kennedy v. Sampson, in which a Member was held to have standing to contest the alleged improper use . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S2.C1.1.8.3 Political Question Doctrine: Current Doctrine
    . . . suggested that the actions of political parties in national nominating conventions may also present issues not meet for judicial resolution. A challenge to the Senates interpretation of and exercise of its impeachment powers was held to be nonjusticiable; there was a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to the Senate, and there was a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • 59. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 60. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 61. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Andrew Johnson;
    Bill Clinton;
    Bribery;
    High Crimes and Misdemeanors;
    Impeachment;
    Political Crime;
    Removal;
    Richard Nixon
    • impeachment (1)
  • 62. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 63. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Andrew Johnson;
    Bill Clinton;
    Bribery;
    High Crimes and Misdemeanors;
    Impeachment;
    Political Crime;
    Removal;
    Richard Nixon


    • impeachment (1)
  • 64. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    . . . Interest;
    Decoration;
    District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018);
    District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018);
    Divest;
    Gifts;
    Emoluments;
    Impeachment;
    In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019);
    Standing
    • impeachment (1)
  • 65. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 66. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Andrew Johnson;
    Bill Clinton;
    Bribery;
    High Crimes and Misdemeanors;
    Impeachment;
    Political Crime;
    Removal;
    Richard Nixon
    • impeachment (1)
  • 67. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 68. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Andrew Johnson;
    Bill Clinton;
    Bribery;
    High Crimes and Misdemeanors;
    Impeachment;
    Political Crime;
    Removal;
    Richard Nixon
    • impeachment (1)
  • 69. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Impeachment
    • impeachment (1)
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