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  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.3 The Power of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice
    Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. While legal doctrine developed from judicial opinions informs much of constitutional law, the understood meaning of the Constitutions provisions is also shaped by institutional practices and. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction 3 (1999); II Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 762 (1833) (The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a political character.). The Federalist No. 37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8. . .
    • impeachment (55)
  • ArtII.S4.2.2 Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The concept of impeachment and the standard of high crimes and misdemeanors originally stems from English Parliamentary practice. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the impeachment clauses, Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background. See The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 54 (1973); H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.7 Impeachable Offenses: Contemporary Judicial Impeachments
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Congress has impeached federal judges with comparatively greater frequency in recent decades, and some of these. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See H. Res. 499 (Aug. 9, 1988); H.R. Rep. No. 100-810, at 8 (1988). Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237--38 (1993). United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1984). Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present 168 (1999). 132 Cong. Rec. H4710--22 (daily ed. July 22, 1986). H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Judge. . .
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  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.2 The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background
    Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The concept of impeachment embodied in the federal Constitution derives from English, colonial, and early state practice. During the struggle in England by Parliament to impose legal restraints on. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the Constitutions impeachment provisions, see Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background. The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 4. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.1 Impeachable Offenses: Early Historical Practice (1789–1860)
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Congressional understanding of the scope of activities subject to impeachment and the potential persons who may be. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .1 Stat. 381, 384 § 5 (June 5, 1794). See Buckner F. Melton, The First Impeachment 60--103 (1998); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 48 (2000); David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789--1801 275--81 (1997). Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the. . .
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  • Resources about Impeachment
    The Constitution Annotated discusses impeachment, per the constitutional provisions shown below, in the following essays: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of . ArtI.S2.C5.1 The Power of ArtI.S2.C5.1.1 The Power of : Overview ArtI.S2. . .
    • impeachment (34)
  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.1 The Power of Impeachment: Overview
    Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to impeach and thereafter remove from office the President, Vice President, and other federal officers—including judges—on account of treason, bribery, or other. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate sole responsibility to try impeachments; Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that the sanctions for an impeached and convicted. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.3 Presidential Impeachments
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all . When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. The Senate has conducted two. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For a more thorough examination of the Johnson impeachment, see discussion infra Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Andrew Johnson. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson; William H. Rehnquist, 16 Const. Comment. 433, 435 (1999); Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction (2015). See Michael J. Gerhardt, The. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.1 The Power to Try Impeachments: Overview
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Just as the. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate sole responsibility to try impeachments; Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that the sanctions for an impeached and convicted. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.6 Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Bill Clinton
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The impeachment of President Bill stemmed from an investigation that originally centered on financial transactions. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See Ken Gormley, Death of American Virtue: Clinton vs. Starr 33--114 (2010). Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present 267 (1999); see generally Whitewater: Timeline, Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/whitewater/timeline.htm (1998) (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). Gormley, supra note , at 143--69. A. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.1.2.1 Offices Eligible for Impeachment
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The Constitution provides that the President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States are subject to removal from office. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. Statements from at least one delegate indicate that participants at the Constitutional Convention assumed that judges were subject to impeachment. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (describing Rufus Kings observation that judges would be impeachable because they hold their office during good behavior). The Federalist No. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.2 The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. The. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the Constitutions impeachment provisions, see Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background. See discussion supra Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background. Charles Black, Impeachment 5--14 (1974). See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.5 Impeachable Offenses: Effort to Impeach Richard Nixon
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The impeachment investigation and ensuing resignation of President Richard stands out as a profoundly important. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For a more detailed account of the Watergate Scandal, see Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate (1990). Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, Wash. Post (Aug. 9, 1974), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/080974-3.htm. Kutler, supra note , at 187--211. Kutler, supra note , at 323--49; Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.1.1 Impeachment and Removal from Office: Overview
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and all federal civil officers. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate sole responsibility to try impeachments; Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that the sanctions for an impeached and convicted. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C7.1.1 Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Overview
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. The. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .-five nays). See Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Fla. 1993). The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate sole responsibility to try impeachments; Article I, Section 3, Clause 7. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.1 Senate Practices in Impeachment
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all s. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. The Senate enjoys broad. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993). Id. at 229--30. Id. at 230. Id. See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). See Impeachment, Complete List of Senate Impeachment Trials, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.1.2.2 Future of the Impeachment Remedy
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. While the historical practices of Congress offer the best guide as to what behavior constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor, this principle. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See supra Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background and accompanying notes. See Charles Black, Impeachment 33--36 (1974). Id. See, e.g., H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 220--26 (1974); H. Res. 370, 98th Cong. (1983) (alleging that President committed high crimes or misdemeanors by ordering. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C7.1.2 Judgment in Cases of Impeachment: Doctrine and Practice
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the background of the Constitutions impeachment provisions, see Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background; The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. See 6 Clarence Cannon, Cannons Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States § 512 (1936), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg. . .
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  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.3 Good Behavior Clause: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. The meaning of the Good Behavior Clause has been the subject of longstanding debate. Some have argued that the phrase denotes an alternative standard of removal for federal judges beyond high crimes and misdemeanors that normally may give rise to the impeachment of federal officers. Others have rejected this notion, reading the. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 122--80 (1973) (arguing that the good behavior standard is distinct from high crimes and misdemeanors and Congress may remove judges whose misbehavior does not constitute a high crime or misdemeanor); Saikrishna Prakash, Steven D. Smith, How to Remove A Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72, 78 (2006) (Congress . . . may establish any number of. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.4 Impeachable Offenses: Early Twentieth Century Practices
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The twentieth century saw further development of the scope of conduct considered by Congress to be impeachable. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • Revised Statutes of the United States, 2d Edition, Title XIII, Ch. 2 § 551 (1878); Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present 123--24 (1999). Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, and Misfortunes: The Federal Impeachment Trials 191 (1992). 39 Cong. Rec. 248 (1905). Bushnell, supra note , at 191--92. Id. at 191--93. Tassel & Finkelman. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.2 Impeachable Offenses: Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The impeachment and trial of President Andrew transpired in the shadow of the Civil War and the assassination of. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments 185--98 (1992). Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, and Misfortunes: The Federal Impeachment Trials 128 (1992). Id. Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present 222 (1999) Bushnell, supra note , at 128. Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 1. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.1 Impeachable Offenses: Overview
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The Constitution provides that the grounds of impeachment are for treason, bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. While the types of. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3 (Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses). See also Act of April 30, 1790 § 21, 1 Stat. 112 (1845) (establishing bribery as a federal criminal offense). See Charles Black, Impeachment 27 (1974). The. . .
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  • ArtII.S4.2.3.3 Impeachable Offenses: Post-Bellum Practices (1865–1900)
    Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The post-bellum experience in American history saw a variety of government officials impeached on a number of different. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . §§ 2504--05. Emily F.V. Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present 119 (1999). See generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, 1863--1877 (1988). 3 Hinds, supra note , at §§ 2506--08. Id.. Id. at § 2509. For a defense of Judge Durells actions in the matters in question, see Charles Lane, Edward Henry Durell: A Study in. . .
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  • Amdt6.3.2.1.1 Right to an Impartial Jury: Current Doctrine
    . . . defendants right to a jury trial has been denied by a biased jury. With origins dating from the English common law, a rule of evidence has been adopted by the federal rules of evidence and by the vast majority of the states that forbids the impeachment or questioning of a verdict by inquiring into the internal deliberations of the jury. The no impeachment rule, which aims to promote full and vigorous. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 858 (2017) (noting that 42 jurisdictions follow the federal rule). The no-impeachment rule does have three central exceptions, allowing a juror to testify about (1) extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jurys attention; (2) outside influences brought to bear on any juror; and (3) a mistake made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. See. . .
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  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.1 Good Behavior Clause: Overview
    . . . subject of debate; in particular, whether the phrase elucidates a distinct standard for removal apart from the high crimes and misdemeanors standard applicable to the impeachment of other federal officers. While this question has not been definitively resolved, historical practice indicates an understanding that the Good Behavior Clause protects federal judges from removal for congressional disagreement. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • The Constitution contains a number of provisions that are relevant to the impeachment of federal officials. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 assigns the Senate sole responsibility to try impeachments; Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that the sanctions for an impeached and convicted. . .
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  • ArtI.S3.C6.1.3.2 Requirement of Oath or Affirmation
    Article I, Section 3, Clause 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or . When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. The Constitution. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. See Charles Black, Impeachment 9--10 (1974). See Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the Senate, S. Doc. No. 93-33, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61 (1986). See Senate Adopts First Impeachment Rules, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Adopts_First_Impeachment_Rules.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). . . .
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  • ArtII.S2.C3.2.4.1.1 Presidential Immunity to Criminal and Civil Suits: Civil Cases
    . . . between the executive and legislative departments of the government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). The Court declined to express an opinion whether, in any case, the President of the United States may be required, by the process of this court, to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime. 71 U.S. at 498. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825--28 (1992) (Justice. . .
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  • Amdt5.3.2.2.3.2.3 Exceptions to Miranda
    . . . statement. Further, once a suspect has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, police officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly invokes them later. The admissions of an unwarned or improperly warned suspect may not be used directly against him at trial, but the Court has permitted some use for other purposes, such as impeachment. A confession or other. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . drugs. The prosecution was permitted to impeach him concerning heroin seized illegally from his home two years before. The Court observed that the defendant could have denied the offense without making the sweeping assertions, as to which the government could impeach him. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The defendant had denied only the commission of the offense. The Court observed that it was only speculative. . .
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  • ArtIII.S1.2.1.2 Good Behavior Clause: Historical Background
    . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Just as the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors for impeachments was borrowed from English practice, so too was the term good behavior borrowed from English law concerning the duration of a judges tenure. Prior to 1701, the tenure of judges in England was established by the Crown, which often reserved the right to remove them. In. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • For more on the historical background of the impeachment clauses, see The Power of Impeachment: Historical Background; The Power to Try Impeachments: Historical Background; Impeachable Offenses: Historical Background. Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges the John R. Coen Lecture Series University of Colorado School of Law, 55 U. . .
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  • Intro.1.2.3.4 What Is Included and Sourced in the Constitution Annotated: Non-Judicial Sources of Constitutional Meaning
    . . . example, the Court has held that the propriety of a Senate trial of impeachment is a political question that cannot be resolved by a federal court. As a result, questions regarding the limits of the power to try impeachments are heavily influenced by both longstanding practices of the Senate, as well as new developments that prompt changes in such practices. Third and finally, non-judicial. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .—and often do—play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation, evolution, and enforcement of constitutional norms.). See Gerhardt, supra note , at 780. Id. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See Gerhardt, supra note , at 780. Id. See Tushnet, supra note , at 439--40. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and. . .
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  • Amdt5.4.8.2.1.2.3 Evidentiary Requirements
    . . . material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This materiality standard, found in contexts outside of Brady inquiries, is applied not only to exculpatory material, but also to material that would be relevant to the impeachment of witnesses. Thus, where inconsistent earlier statements by a. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . ., to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses against the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Nor has it been settled whether inconsistent prosecutorial theories in separate cases can be the basis for a due process challenge. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (Court remanded case to determine whether death sentence was based on defendants. . .
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  • ArtII.S2.C3.2.3 Executive Privilege: Overview
    . . . review. Because of these cases, because of the intensified congressional-presidential dispute, and especially because of the introduction of the issue into an impeachment proceeding, a somewhat lengthy treatment of the doctrine is called for. Conceptually, the doctrine of executive privilege may well reflect different considerations in different factual situations. Congress may seek information within. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . set out in a June 9, 1974, letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 10 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 592 (1974). The impeachment article and supporting material are set out in H. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020). Id. at 2031--32. Id. at 2033. Id. at 2033--34. Id. While the papers at stake in Mazars were the Presidents personal records, the. . .
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  • ArtI.S2.C5.1.4.1 Alternatives to Impeachment
    Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of . As an alternative to the impeachment process, both houses of Congress have occasionally formally announced their disproval of a particular executive branch official by adopting a resolution censuring, condemning, or. . .
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  • 34. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Obtaining Witnesses in an Impeachment Trial: Compulsion, Executive Privilege, and the Courts | Impeachment ; Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section 3,. . . | 2020-01-21
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  • ArtII.S2.C2.2.1.5.1 Removing Officers: Doctrine During 1930s
    . . . Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. The Myers Case Save for the provision which it makes for a power of impeachment of civil officers of. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .272 U.S. 52 (1926). 19 Stat. 78, 80. 272 U.S. at 163--64. The reticence of the Constitution respecting removal left room for four possibilities: first, the one suggested by the common law doctrine of estate in office, from which the conclusion followed that the impeachment power was the only power of removal intended by the Constitution; second, that the power of removal was an incident of the. . .
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  • 36. Preamble
    Pre.1.3 Preamble: Doctrine and Practice
    . . .. Decades later, Representative Barbara Jordan, the first African-American woman elected to the House of Representatives from the South, quoted the Preamble in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee as it considered the Articles of Impeachment for President Richard Nixon. In that statement, she noted that through the process of amendment, interpretation, and court decision she had been included. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings on H. Res. 803 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 111 (1974) (statement of Rep. Jordan). Id. 153 Cong. Rec. H2722 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2007) (statement of Rep. Garrett). Proclamation No. 5634, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,622 (Apr. 21, 1987). Proclamation No. 8367, 74 Fed. Reg. 20,861 (May 5, 2009). . . .
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  • Amdt6.7.2.3 When the Right to Counsel Applies
    . . . prosecutions case and thereby save the defendant from being bound over, and could in any event preserve for use in cross-examination at trial and impeachment purposes testimony he could elicit at the hearing; he could discover as much as possible of the prosecutions case against defendant for better trial preparation; and he could influence the court in such matters as bail and psychiatric examination. The. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .). 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 467 U.S. at 446. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (post-arraignment statement taken in violation of Sixth Amendment is admissible to impeach defendants inconsistent trial testimony); Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (statement made to informant planted in defendants holding cell admissible for impeachment purposes because the interests safeguarded by. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.1.2.1.2 Inherent Powers of Federal Courts: Contempt and Sanctions
    . . . negation of all other modes of punishment. The abuse of this extensive power led, following the unsuccessful impeachment of Judge James H. Peck of the Federal District Court of Missouri, to the passage of the Act of 1831 limiting the power of the federal courts to punish contempts to misbehavior in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, to the. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . ., § 17 (1789). 18 U.S.C. § 401. For a summary of the Peck impeachment and the background of the act of 1831, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in Inferior Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024--1028 (1924). 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874). 86 U.S. at 505--11. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • Amdt5.3.1.2 General Protections Against Self-Incrimination: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . doctrinal explanation to identify the differences between permissible and impermissible coercion. It has long been the rule that a defendant who takes the stand on his own behalf does so voluntarily, and cannot then claim the privilege to defeat cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination, and that such a defendant may be impeached by proof of prior. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . of an arrestees sanity. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986). In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the prosecution violated due process by using his post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes at trial, the proper standard for harmless-error review is that announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)—whether the. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.2.2 Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts: Doctrine and Practice
    . . ., receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. One Supreme Court While the Convention specified that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would preside over any Presidential impeachment trial in the Senate, decisions on the size and composition of the Supreme Court, the time and place for sitting, its internal organization, and other. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.1 Scope of the Pardon Power
    . . . respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The pardon power embraces all offences against the United States, except cases of impeachment, and includes the power to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures, except as to money covered into the Treasury or paid an informer, the power to pardon absolutely or. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtI.S7.C3.1 Passage of Orders, Resolutions, or Votes
    . . .. The other major component of the Courts reasoning in Chadha stemmed from its reading of the Constitution as making only explicit and unambiguous exceptions to the bicameralism and presentment requirements. Thus the House alone was given power of impeachment, and the Senate alone was given power to convict upon impeachment, to advise and consent to executive appointments, and to advise and consent to. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.2 Commander in Chief Power: Doctrine and Practice
    . . . the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The Limited View The purely military aspects of the Commander-in-Chiefship were those that were originally stressed. Hamilton said the office would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the Military and naval. . .
    • impeachment (2)
  • 44. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    The Impeachment and Trial of a Former President | Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section. . . | 2021-01-15
    • impeachment (2)
  • 45. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Resources about Impeachment | Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section 2,. . . | 2019-12-05
    • impeachment (2)
  • 46. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Impeachment and the Constitution | Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section 2,. . . | 2019-11-20
    • impeachment (2)
  • 47. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Congressional Access to Information in an Impeachment Investigation | Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section 2,. . . | 2019-10-25
    • impeachment (2)
  • 48. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Impeachment Investigations: Law and Process | Impeachment . . . | Article I, Section 2,. . . | 2019-10-02
    • impeachment (2)
  • ArtIII.S2.C3.1 In General
    Article III, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. See analysis under the Sixth Amendment. . . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt6.3.3.1 Right to a Local Jury: Historical Background
    Sixth Amendment: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committ. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by law have directed. Vicinage means neighborhood, and vicinage of the jury means jury of the neighborhood or, in medieval. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C3.1.3.1 Recess Appointments of Article III Judges
    . . . judges are appointed during good behavior, subject only to removal through impeachment. A judge, however, who is given a recess appointment may be removed by the Senates failure to advise and consent to his appointment; moreover, on the bench, prior to Senate confirmation, he or she may be subject to influence not felt by other judges. Nonetheless, a constitutional attack upon the status of a federal. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.1 Commander in Chief Power: Historical Background
    . . . the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Surprisingly little discussion of the Commander-in-Chief Clause is found in the Convention or in the ratifying debates. From the evidence available, it appears that the Framers vested the duty in the President because experience in the. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S1.C8.1 Oath of Office
    . . . decision that they were unwarranted by the Constitution. The idea next turned up in a message by President Lincoln justifying his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus without obtaining congressional authorization. And counsel to President Johnson during his impeachment trial adverted to the theory, but only in passing. Beyond these isolated instances, it does not appear to be seriously contended that. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.3 Congress's Ability to Limit the Pardon Power
    . . . Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Congress cannot limit the effects of a presidential amnesty. Thus the act of July 12, 1870, making proof of loyalty necessary to recover property abandoned and sold by the government during the Civil War, notwithstanding any executive. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.2 Presidential Advisors
    . . . respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The authority in Article II, § 2, cl. 1 to require the written opinion of the heads of executive departments is the meager residue from a persistent effort in the Federal Convention to impose a council on the President. The idea ultimately failed, partly because. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Intro.2.3 Cross-Cutting Issues in the Constitution Annotated: Who Interprets the Constitution?
    . . . Constitution gave the Senate alone the power to determine whether it had properly tried an impeachment. And the Court may not have the last word on other issues, such as the existence of a national bank, because other constitutional actors (e.g., the President) may play a decisive role by exercising their own constitutional powers. As a result, Congress and the President each interpret the Constitution. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt5.2.1.1 Double Jeopardy Clause: Historical Background
    . . . elevation to fundamental status by its inclusion in several state bills of rights following the Revolution continued the differing approaches. Madisons version of the guarantee as introduced in the House of Representatives read: No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense. Opposition in the House proceeded on the proposition that. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S1.1.2.1 Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts: Historical Background
    . . . such powers in inferior federal courts. The requirement that judges hold their office during good behavior excited no controversy during the Convention, although the lack of an enforcement mechanism for this provision resulted in impeachment under Article II becoming the primary mechanism for removal of a federal judge. And finally, the only substantial dispute that arose regarding the denial to. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Amdt4.5.2.1 Adoption of a Federal Exclusionary Rule
    . . . substantially curbed. For instance, defendants who themselves were not subjected to illegal searches and seizures may not object to the introduction of evidence illegally obtained from co-conspirators or codefendants, and even a defendant whose rights have been infringed may find the evidence admitted, not as proof of guilt, but to impeach his testimony. Further, evidence obtained through a wrongful search. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . Amendment rights of third parties in order to obtain evidence to use against others when the agents knew that the defendant would be unable to challenge their conduct under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (now vitiated by Havens). The impeachment exception applies only to the. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.3.1.2 Legal Effect of a Pardon
    s for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. In the first case to be decided concerning the pardoning power, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, said: As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • Intro.2.3 Cross-Cutting Issues in the Constitution Annotated: Who Interprets the Constitution?
    . . . Constitution gave the Senate alone the power to determine whether it had properly tried an impeachment. And the Court may not have the last word on other issues, such as the existence of a national bank, because other constitutional actors (e.g., the President) may play a decisive role by exercising their own constitutional powers. As a result, Congress and the President each interpret the Constitution. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S2.C1.2.5.3.3 Standing Requirement: Standing of Federal and State Legislators
    . . . to be beyond his constitutional authority, the holding would have a distinct and significant bearing upon the Members duties to vote appropriations and other supportive legislation and to consider impeachment. The breadth of this rationale was disapproved in subsequent cases. The leading decision is Kennedy v. Sampson, in which a Member was held to have standing to contest the alleged improper use. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.3.2 Provision for Detention and Trial of Prisoners of War and Enemy Combatants
    . . ., upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs In 1942 eight youths, seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received training in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two German submarines. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C1.1.3.1 Imposing Martial Law
    . . . respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628, provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial law; that is to say, martial law is not established by official. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIII.S2.C1.2.8.3 Political Question Doctrine: Current Doctrine
    . . . nominating conventions may also present issues not meet for judicial resolution. A challenge to the Senates interpretation of and exercise of its impeachment powers was held to be nonjusticiable; there was a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to the Senate, and there was a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue. Despite the occasional resort to the. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S2.C2.2.1.5.2 Removing Officers: Current Doctrine
    . . .. Consequently, the Court determined, the removal powers over the Comptroller Generals office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress. Relying expressly upon Myers, the Court concluded that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. But Humphreys Executor was also cited with approval, and to the contention that. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtII.S3.1.3.1 Take Care Clause: Overview
    . . . against him the processes of impeachment or of criminal prosecutions. The opinion entirely overlooked the important question of the location of the power to interpret the law, which is inevitably involved in any effort to enforce it. The diametrically opposed theory that Congress is unable to vest any head of an executive department, even within the field of Congresss specifically delegated powers, with. . .
    • impeachment (1)
  • 68. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    Proposals to Modify Supreme Court Justices’ Tenure: Legal Considerations | Impeachment . . . | Article III, Section 1 | 2021-03-24
    • impeachment (1)
  • 69. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • 70. Resources
    Beyond the Constitution Annotated: Table of Additional Resources
    • impeachment (1)
  • ArtIV.S1.1.1.2.2 Judicial Proceedings
    . . . confession of judgment upon a note, with a warrant of attorney annexed, in favor of the holder, is in conformity with a state law and usage as declared by the highest court of the state in which the judgment is rendered, the judgement may be collaterally impeached upon the ground that the party in whose behalf it was rendered was not in fact the holder. But a consent decree, which under the law of the. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken). On the same basis, a judgment cannot be impeached either in or out of the state by showing that it was based on a mistake of law. American Express Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311, 312 (1909). Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • ArtIII.S2.C1.3.7 Controversies Between a State or Its Citizens and Foreign States/Citizens
    Article III, Section 2, Clause 1: The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . that a lower federal court had jurisdiction over a proceeding to impeach its former decree, although the parties were new and were both aliens. Browne v. Strode, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 303 (1809). . . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • ArtI.S2.C2.1 Qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives
    Article I, Section 2, Clause 2: No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .. at 787--98, and by the dissenters, who would hold that Congress, for different reasons could not add to qualifications, although the states could. Id. at 875--76. The Court declined to reach the question whether the Constitution in fact does impose other qualifications.395 U.S. at 520 n.41 (possibly Article I, § 3, cl. 7, disqualifying persons impeached, Article I, § 6, cl. 2, incompatible offices. . .
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  • ArtI.S6.C1.1.3 Speech and Debate Privilege
    Article I, Section 6, Clause 1: The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They sha. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966). That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament. 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177--79, 180--83 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969). United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966). United. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Amdt6.7.2.1.2 Right to Have Counsel Appointed: Current Doctrine
    Sixth Amendment: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committ. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . .. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (error to have permitted counseled defendant in 1947 trial to have his credibility impeached by introduction of prior uncounseled convictions in the 1930s; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (error for sentencing judge in 1953 to have relied on. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Amdt5.3.1.3.1 Self-Incrimination and the Concept of Immunity
    Fifth Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forc. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . constitutionally adequate. Id. at 462, 467. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist did not participate but Justice Brennans views that transactional immunity was required had been previously stated. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (dissenting). See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (prosecution use of defendants immunized testimony to impeach him at trial violates Self-Incrimination Clause. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Intro.2.2.2 The Constitution's Basic Principles: Separation of Powers
    . . . Framers incorporated various checks that each branch could exercise against the actions of the other two branches to resist such encroachments. For example, the President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, but Congress may overrule such vetoes by a supermajority vote of both houses. And Congress has the power to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and civil officers of. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Intro.2.2.2 The Constitution's Basic Principles: Separation of Powers
    . . . Framers incorporated various checks that each branch could exercise against the actions of the other two branches to resist such encroachments. For example, the President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, but Congress may overrule such vetoes by a supermajority vote of both houses. And Congress has the power to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and civil officers of. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Amdt14.S1.4.1.3.1.4 Facially Neutral Laws Implicating a Racial Minority
    Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.. . .
    • Footnotes:
      • . . . voiding governmental action upon an assessment of official motive, id. at 224--26, but it also drew the conclusion (and the Davis Court read it as actually deciding) that, because the pools were closed for everyone, not just black residents, there was no discrimination. The citys avowed reason for closing the pools—to avoid violence and economic loss—could not be impeached by allegations of a racial. . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • Amdt6.5.1.3 Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses: Current Doctrine
    . . . procedures allowed full and effective opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial and request reconsideration of the competency ruling. And there is no absolute right to confront witnesses with relevant evidence impeaching those witnesses; failure to comply with a rape shield laws notice requirement can validly preclude introduction of evidence relating to a witnesss prior sexual history. . . .
    • impeachment (0)
  • ArtIV.S1.1.1.2.1 Public Acts and Records
    . . . adjudication of guilt as not denying full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce decree. Reiterating the doctrine that jurisdiction to grant divorce is founded on domicile, the Court held that a decree of divorce rendered in one state may be collaterally impeached in another by proof that the court that rendered the decree lacked jurisdiction (the parties not having been domiciled therein), even though the. . .
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